Most Popular Books by Daron Acemoglu

ALERT: Before you purchase, check with your instructor or review your course syllabus to ensure that you select the correct ISBN. Several versions of Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products exist for each title, including customized versions for individual schools, and registrations are not transferable. In addition, you may need a CourseID, provided by your instructor, to register for and use Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products. Packages Access codes for Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products may not be included when purchasing or renting from companies other than Pearson; check with the seller before completing your purchase. Used or rental books If you rent or purchase a used book with an access code, the access code may have been redeemed previously and you may have to purchase a new access code. Access codes Access codes that are purchased from sellers other than Pearson carry a higher risk of being either the wrong ISBN or a previously redeemed code. Check with the seller prior to purchase. -- For courses in Principles of Economics This package includes MyEconLab®. Acemoglu, Laibson, List: An evidence-based approach to economics Throughout Economics, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help students learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, the authors use the themes of optimization, equilibrium and empiricism to illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, and their ability to explain, predict, and improve what happens in the world. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text''s practical emphasis, students will learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives. Personalize learning with MyEconLab MyEconLab is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment program designed to work with this text to engage students and improve results. Within its structured environment, students practice what they learn, test their understanding, and pursue a personalized study plan that helps them better absorb course material and understand difficult concepts. This package contains: * 0321391586 / 9780321391582: Economics, 1/e * 0133487741 / 9780133487749: MyEconLab with Pearson eText Access Card for Economics, 1/e

Cos''è davvero il progresso? Nel corso della storia dell''umanità, il cambiamento tecnologico – che si tratti dei miglioramenti agricoli nel Medioevo, della Rivoluzione industriale o dell''odierna intelligenza artificiale – è stato visto come il principale motore della prosperità, qualcosa da cui avremmo tratto solo vantaggi. La realtà, però, si è sempre rivelata più complessa. Nel XIX secolo, l''introduzione della sgranatrice aumentò enormemente la produttività della coltivazione di cotone e trasformò gli Stati Uniti nel suo primo esportatore mondiale, ma allo stesso modo intensificò la ferocia dello schiavismo e della segregazione razziale. A partire da esempi come questo e guardando alla contemporaneità, Daron Acemoglu e Simon Johnson sfatano il mito del tecnottimismo moderno. È vero: ce la passiamo enormemente meglio dei nostri antenati, ma gli ultimi mille anni hanno visto la diffusione di invenzioni che non hanno affatto portato al benessere collettivo e i risultati sono sotto i nostri occhi. Una visione nuova e più inclusiva della tecnologia potrà emergere solo se prendiamo coscienza del nostro potere sociale, lottando per fare in modo che le innovazioni siano al servizio di tutti. Acemoglu e Johnson scrivono un manifesto per una società migliore, insistendo sulla necessità di assicurarci che la tecnologia crei nuovi posti di lavoro e nuove opportunità, anziché emarginare la maggior parte delle persone, attraverso il lavoro automatizzato e la passività politica. Solo così potremo realizzare il vero potenziale del progresso, ripensando la teoria economica in modo rivoluzionario.

ALERT: Before you purchase, check with your instructor or review your course syllabus to ensure that you select the correct ISBN. Several versions of Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products exist for each title, including customized versions for individual schools, and registrations are not transferable. In addition, you may need a CourseID, provided by your instructor, to register for and use Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products. Packages Access codes for Pearson''s MyLab & Mastering products may not be included when purchasing or renting from companies other than Pearson; check with the seller before completing your purchase. Used or rental books If you rent or purchase a used book with an access code, the access code may have been redeemed previously and you may have to purchase a new access code. Access codes Access codes that are purchased from sellers other than Pearson carry a higher risk of being either the wrong ISBN or a previously redeemed code. Check with the seller prior to purchase. -- For courses in Principles of Macroeconomics This package includes MyEconLab®. Acemoglu, Laibson, List: An evidence-based approach to economics Throughout Macroeconomics, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help students learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, the authors use the themes of optimization, equilibrium and empiricism to illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, and their ability to explain, predict, and improve what happens in the world. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text''s practical emphasis, students will learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives. Personalize learning with MyEconLab MyEconLab is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment program designed to work with this text to engage students and improve results. Within its structured environment, students practice what they learn, test their understanding, and pursue a personalized study plan that helps them better absorb course material and understand difficult concepts. 0133578003 / 9780133578003 Macroeconomics Plus NEW MyEconLab with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package This package contains: * 0321383958 / 9780321383952: Macroeconomics, 1/e * 0133498999 / 9780133498998: MyEconLab with Pearson eText Access Card for Macroeconomics, 1/e

Sử dụng lịch sử Đông-Tây kim-cổ đã diễn ra trên tất cả các châu lục của trái đất này, hai tác giả lập luận rằng những quốc gia thất bại là những đất nước bị cai trị bởi một nhóm quyền thế tập trung, và những nhóm này đã tổ chức xã hội để phục vụ cho quyền lợi riêng của họ trong khi đại đa số quần chúng nhân dân phải trả giá. Thế lực chính trị bị tập trung trong một nhóm nhỏ, được sử dụng để tạo ra tài sản khổng lồ cho những người nắm giữ quyền lực. Trong khi đó, những nước trở nên giàu có là vì người dân nước đó lật đổ giới quyền thế, những người kiểm soát quyền lực, và tạo ra một xã hội trong đó các quyền chính trị được phân phối rộng rãi, trong đó chính phủ có trách nhiệm giải trình và phải đáp ứng trước công dân, và trong đó đại đa số quần chúng có thể tranh thủ các cơ hội kinh tế. Tóm lại, điều cuốn sách muốn nhắm đến là thể chế nào có những điều chỉnh, cải cách để dung hợp được các lợi ích kinh tế-chính trị và tạo điều kiện cho người dân làm ăn sinh sống được tốt nhất sẽ thành công. Như sách đã chỉ ra, ngay như Trung Quốc, khi họ giải quyết được phần nào đó sự dung hợp này, họ đã có sự tăng trưởng thần kỳ. Và giờ đây họ vẫn tiếp tục giải quyết bài toán thể chế dung hợp của họ.

Um livro que vai mudar a maneira como você vê e entende o mundo Nesse clássico moderno da economia e das ciências humanas, Daron Acemoglu e James A. Robinson investigam a história de civilizações separadas tanto pelo tempo quanto pela geografia para responder a uma questão que há séculos intriga os estudiosos: por que algumas nações são ricas e outras são pobres? Por meio de uma teoria de base universal, os autores afirmam que as estruturas sociais criadas pelo homem são o que sustenta o sucesso econômico — e o fracasso — das nações. Os países só escapam à pobreza quando dispõem de instituições adequadas, com a preservação do direito à propriedade privada e da livre concorrência. Acemoglu e Robinson defendem, ainda, a tese original de que a probabilidade de os países desenvolverem boas instituições é maior quando contam com um sistema político pluralista e aberto, com disputa de cargos, eleitorado amplo e espaço para a emergência de novos líderes. A partir desses argumentos, demonstram como algumas mudanças podem contribuir para instituições mais plurais, inovações progressistas e êxito econômico, enquanto outras, ao contrário, só estabelecerão mais instituições repressoras e extrativistas que levarão os países à decadência e à estagnação.

0133578119 / 9780133578119 Macroeconomics, Student Value Edition Plus NEW MyEconLab with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package Package consists of: 0133487164 / 9780133487169 Macroeconomics, Student Value Edition 0133498999 / 9780133498998 NEW MyEconLab with Pearson eText -- Access Card -- for Macroeconomics

Throughout history, the advantages and costs of technological innovations have been unevenly distributed between the powerful and the rest of society, assert economists Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson in their new book, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. In a Q&A, they discuss what’s wrong with today’s approach to automation, why machine usefulness is more important than machine intelligence, and what techno-optimists and -pessimists both get wrong.

This paper shows that large economic downturns may result from the propagation of micro-economic shocks over the input-output linkages across different firms or sectors within the economy. Building on the framework of Acemoglu et al. (2012), we argue that the economy''s input-output structure can fundamentally reshape the distribution of aggregate output, increasing the likelihood of large downturns from infinitesimal to substantial. More specifically, we show that an economy with non-trivial inter-sectoral input-output linkages that is subject to thin-tailed productivity shocks may exhibit deep recessions as frequently as economies that are subject to heavy-tailed shocks. Moreover, we show that in the presence of input-output linkages, aggregate volatility is not necessarily a sufficient statistic for the likelihood of large downturns. Rather, depending on the shape of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, different features of the economy''s input-output network may be of first-order importance. Finally, our results establish that the effects of the economy''s input-output structure and the nature of the idiosyncratic firm level shocks on aggregate output are not separable, in the sense that the likelihood of large economic downturns is determined by the interplay between the two. Keywords: input-output networks, aggregate output, business cycles, economic downturns. JEL Classification: C67, E32.

This paper documents that the Rise of (Western) Europe between 1500 and 1850 is largely accounted for by the growth of European nations with access to the Atlantic, and especially by those nations that engaged in colonialism and long distance oceanic trade. Moreover, Atlantic ports grew much faster than other West European cities, including Mediterranean ports. Atlantic trade and colonialism affected Europe both directly, and indirectly by inducing institutional changes. In particular, the growth of New World, African, and Asian trade after 1500 strengthened new segments of the commercial bourgeoisie, and enabled these groups to demand, obtain, and sustain changes in institutions to protect their property rights. Furthermore, the most significant institutional changes and consequently the most substantial economic gains occurred in nations where existing institutions placed some checks on the monarchy and particularly limited its control of overseas trading activities, thus enabling new merchants in these countries to benefit from Atlantic trade. Therefore, the Rise of Europe was largely the result of capitalist development driven by the interaction of late medieval institutions and the economic opportunities offered by "Atlantic trade." Keywords: Capitalism, Economic Growth, Institutions, Political Economy, Social Conflict, Trade. JEL Classifications: O10, F10, P10, N13.

Thomas Piketty''s (2013) book, Capital in the 21st Century, follows in the tradition of the great classical economists, like Marx and Ricardo, in formulating general laws of capitalism to diagnose and predict the dynamics of inequality. We argue that general economic laws are unhelpful as a guide to understand the past or predict the future, because they ignore the central role of political and economic institutions, as well as the endogenous evolution of technology, in shaping the distribution of resources in society. We use regression evidence to show that the main economic force emphasized in Piketty''s book, the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate, does not appear to explain historical patterns of inequality (especially, the share of income accruing to the upper tail of the distribution). We then use the histories of inequality of South Africa and Sweden to illustrate that inequality dynamics cannot be understood without embedding economic factors in the context of economic and political institutions, and also that the focus on the share of top incomes can give a misleading characterization of the true nature of inequality. Keywords: Capitalism, Inequality, Institutions. JEL Classification: P16, P48, O20.

This paper revisits the important ideas proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz''s seminal 1969 paper on technological change. After linking these ideas to the induced innovation literature of the 1960s and the more recent directed technological change literature, it explains how these three complementary but different approaches are useful in the study of a range of current research areas though they may also yield different answers to important questions. It concludes by highlighting several important areas where these ideas can be fruitfully applied in future work. Keywords: Biased technological change, directed technological change, localized technological change, innovation, skill-biased technological change, technology. JEL Classification: E25, J31, O30, O31, O33.

"We revisit one of the central empirical findings of the political economy literature that higher income per capita causes democracy. Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, but do not typically control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We also present instrumental-variables using two different strategies. These estimates also show no causal effect of income on democracy. Furthermore, we reconcile the positive cross-country correlation between income and democracy with the absence of a causal effect of income on democracy by showing that the long-run evolution of income and democracy is related to historical factors. Consistent with this, the positive correlation between income and democracy disappears, even without fixed effects, when we control for the historical determinants of economic and political development in a sample of former European colonies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Robert Gordon''s The Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth provides a compelling interpretation of how technical change and innovation has radically changed the living standards of the citizens of the US in the past 150 years. Lying behind these changes are the institutions which have allowed the country to harness its human potential. In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of one key set of institutions, the capacity of the US state as proxied by the presence of post offices in a county, on innovation. We show that between 1804 and 1899, the time when the US became the world technological leader, there is a strong association between the presence and number of post offices in a county and patenting activity, and it appears that it is the opening of postal offices that leads to surges in patenting activity, not the other way around. Our evidence suggests that part of the yet untold story of US technological exceptionalism is the way in which the US created an immensely capable and effective state.

ciently forward-looking.

This paper proposes a tractable model to study the equilibrium diversity of technological progress and shows that equilibrium technological progress may exhibit too little diversity (too much conformity), in particular foregoing socially beneficial investments in "alternative" technologies that will be used at some point in the future. The presence of future innovations that will replace current innovations imply that social benefits from innovation are not fully internalized. As a consequence, the market favors technologies that generate current gains relative to those that will bear fruit in the future; current innovations in research lines that will be profitable in the future are discouraged because current innovations are typically followed by further innovations before they can be profitably marketed. A social planner would choose a more diverse research portfolio and would induce a higher growth rate than the equilibrium allocation. The diversity of researchers is a partial (imperfect) remedy against the mis-allocation induced by the market. Researchers with different interests, competences or ideas may choose non-profit maximizing and thus more diverse research portfolios, indirectly contributing to economic growth. Keywords: Economic growth, diversity, innovation, research, science, technological change. JEL Classifications: O30, O31, O33, C65.

We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia. Keywords: democracy, de facto power, de jure power, dictatorship, elites, institutions, labor repression, persistence, political economy. JEL Classifications: H2, N10, N40, P16.

I discuss the role of economic theory in empirical work in development economics with special emphasis on general equilibrium and political economy considerations. I argue that economic theory plays (should play) a central role in formulating models, estimates of which can be used for counterfactual and policy analysis. I discuss why counterfactual analysis based on microdata that ignores general equilibrium and political economy issues may lead to misleading conclusions. I illustrate the main arguments using examples from recent work in development economics and political economy. Keywords: economic development, economic theory, methodology of economics, political. JEL Classifications: O10, O12, B41, D50, P48.

Kremer, Willis, and You (2021) revisit cross-country convergence patterns over the last six decades. They provide evidence that the lack of convergence that applied early in the sample has now been replaced by modest convergence. They also argue this relationship is driven by convergence in various determinants of economic growth across countries and a flattening of the relationship between these determinants and growth. Although the patterns documented by the authors are intriguing, our reanalysis finds that these results are driven by the lack of country fixed effects controlling for unobserved determinants of GDP per capita across countries. We show theoretically and empirically that failure to include country fixed effects will create a bias in convergence coeffcients towards zero and this bias can be time-varying, even when the underlying country-level parameters are stable. These results are relevant not just for the current paper, but for the convergence literature more generally. Our reanalysis finds no evidence of major changes in patterns of convergence and, more importantly, no flattening of the relationship between institutional variables and economic growth. Focusing on democracy, we show that this variable''s impact continues to be precisely estimated and if anything a little larger than at the beginning of the sample.

The propagation of macroeconomic shocks through input-output and geographic networks can be a powerful driver of macroeconomic fluctuations. We first exposit that in the presence of Cobb-Douglas production functions and consumer preferences, there is a specific pattern of economic transmission whereby demand-side shocks propagate upstream (to input-supplying industries) and supply-side shocks propagate downstream (to customer industries) and that there is a tight relationship between the direct impact of a shock and the magnitudes of the downstream and the upstream indirect effects. We then investigate the short-run propagation of four different types of industry-level shocks: two demand-side ones (the exogenous component of the variation in industry imports from China and changes in federal spending) and two supply side ones (TFP shocks and variation in knowledge/ideas coming from foreign patenting). In each case, we find substantial propagation of these shocks through the input-output network, with a pattern broadly consistent with theory. Quantitatively, the network-based propagation is larger than the direct effects of the shocks. We also show quantitatively large effects from the geographic network, capturing the fact that the local propagation of a shock to an industry will fall more heavily on other industries that tend to collocate with it across local markets. Our results suggest that the transmission of various different types of shocks through economic networks and industry interlinkages could have first-order implications for the macroeconomy. Keywords: Economic fluctuations, geographic collocation, input-output linkages, networks, propagation, shocks. JEL Classification: E32.

Modernization theory is a cornerstone of much of political science, despite the mounting evidence against its predictions. In this paper, we argue that the theory''s failings are rooted in predictions that are not conditioned on history and cultural configurations. We outline a theory in which the interplay of the distribution of political power and cultural configurations lead to three distinct self-reinforcing paths of political development, with very different state-society relations, institutions, and economic structures. These are paths to Despotic, Absent and Shackled leviathans. The role of cultural configurations, made up of attributes in a society''s culture set, is critical in legitimizing the social arrangements in each path. For example, a Despotic Leviathan, as in China, cannot be understood without appreciating how Confucian culture has been used to bolster a worldview in which rulers are supposed to be virtuous and regular people are discouraged from political participation. We argued that this interpretation is not inherent to Confucian thought, but has to be understood as an endogenous outcome along the trajectory to the Despotic Leviathan. None of the three different paths we highlight support modernization theory. Under the Absent Leviathan, there is no economic modernization. Under the Despotic Leviathan, economic growth bolsters the existing regime and its supporting cultural configuration, with no tendency towards democracy or associate political changes. Under the Shackled Leviathan, there are dynamics leading to economic growth and political changes with greater bottom-up participation. Nevertheless, the causation does not go from the former to the latter, and these changes are critically dependent on cultural and political entrepreneurship in order to formulate and popularize new cultural configurations and institutionalize political changes.