Most Popular Books by Daron Acemoglu

NEW YORK TIMES AND WALL STREET JOURNAL BESTSELLER • From two winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, “who have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for a country’s prosperity” “A wildly ambitious work that hopscotches through history and around the world to answer the very big question of why some countries get rich and others don’t.”—The New York Times FINALIST: Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award • ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR: The Washington Post, Financial Times, The Economist, BusinessWeek, Bloomberg, The Christian Science Monitor, The Plain Dealer Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, or geography that determines prosperity or poverty? As Why Nations Fail shows, none of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Drawing on fifteen years of original research, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is our man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or the lack of it). Korea, to take just one example, is a remarkably homogenous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created those two different institutional trajectories. Acemoglu and Robinson marshal extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, among them: • Will China’s economy continue to grow at such a high speed and ultimately overwhelm the West? • Are America’s best days behind it? Are we creating a vicious cycle that enriches and empowers a small minority? “This book will change the way people think about the wealth and poverty of nations . . . as ambitious as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.”—BusinessWeek

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

The bestselling co-author of Why Nations Fail and the bestselling co-author of 13 Bankers deliver a bold reinterpretation of economics and history that will fundamentally change how you see the world A thousand years of history and contemporary evidence make one thing clear: progress depends on the choices we make about technology. New ways of organizing production and communication can either serve the narrow interests of an elite or become the foundation for widespread prosperity. The wealth generated by technological improvements in agriculture during the European Middle Ages was captured by the nobility and used to build grand cathedrals, while peasants remained on the edge of starvation. The first hundred years of industrialization in England delivered stagnant incomes for working people. And throughout the world today, digital technologies and artificial intelligence undermine jobs and democracy through excessive automation, massive data collection, and intrusive surveillance. It doesn’t have to be this way. Power and Progress demonstrates the path of technology was once—and may again—be brought under control. Cutting-edge technological advances can become empowering and democratizing tools, but not if all major decisions remain in the hands of a few hubristic tech leaders. With their bold reinterpretation of economics and history, Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson fundamentally change how we see the world, providing the vision needed to redirect innovation so it again benefits most people.

From Nobel Prize–winning economist Daron Acemoglu, an incisive introduction to economic growth Introduction to Modern Economic Growth is a groundbreaking text from one of today''s leading economists. Daron Acemoglu gives graduate students not only the tools to analyze growth and related macroeconomic problems, but also the broad perspective needed to apply those tools to the big-picture questions of growth and divergence. And he introduces the economic and mathematical foundations of modern growth theory and macroeconomics in a rigorous but easy to follow manner. After covering the necessary background on dynamic general equilibrium and dynamic optimization, the book presents the basic workhorse models of growth and takes students to the frontier areas of growth theory, including models of human capital, endogenous technological change, technology transfer, international trade, economic development, and political economy. The book integrates these theories with data and shows how theoretical approaches can lead to better perspectives on the fundamental causes of economic growth and the wealth of nations. Innovative and authoritative, this book is likely to shape how economic growth is taught and learned for years to come. Introduces all the foundations for understanding economic growth and dynamic macroeconomic analysis Focuses on the big-picture questions of economic growth Provides mathematical foundations Presents dynamic general equilibrium Covers models such as basic Solow, neoclassical growth, and overlapping generations, as well as models of endogenous technology and international linkages Addresses frontier research areas such as international linkages, international trade, political economy, and economic development and structural change An accompanying Student Solutions Manual containing the answers to selected exercises is available (978-0-691-14163-3/$24.95). See: https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8970.html For Professors only: To access a complete solutions manual online, email us at: [email protected]

From the winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize for Economics and the authors of the international bestseller Why Nations Fail "Why is it so difficult to develop and sustain liberal democracy? The best recent work on this subject comes from a remarkable pair of scholars, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. In their latest book, The Narrow Corridor, they have answered this question with great insight." —Fareed Zakaria, The Washington Post In Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that countries rise and fall based not on culture, geography, or chance, but on the power of their institutions. In their new book, they build a new theory about liberty and how to achieve it, drawing a wealth of evidence from both current affairs and disparate threads of world history. Liberty is hardly the "natural" order of things. In most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats, or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Liberty emerges only when a delicate and precarious balance is struck between state and society. There is a Western myth that political liberty is a durable construct, arrived at by a process of "enlightenment." This static view is a fantasy, the authors argue. In reality, the corridor to liberty is narrow and stays open only via a fundamental and incessant struggle between state and society: The authors look to the American Civil Rights Movement, Europe’s early and recent history, the Zapotec civilization circa 500 BCE, and Lagos’s efforts to uproot corruption and institute government accountability to illustrate what it takes to get and stay in the corridor. But they also examine Chinese imperial history, colonialism in the Pacific, India’s caste system, Saudi Arabia’s suffocating cage of norms, and the “Paper Leviathan” of many Latin American and African nations to show how countries can drift away from it, and explain the feedback loops that make liberty harder to achieve. Today we are in the midst of a time of wrenching destabilization. We need liberty more than ever, and yet the corridor to liberty is becoming narrower and more treacherous. The danger on the horizon is not "just" the loss of our political freedom, however grim that is in itself; it is also the disintegration of the prosperity and safety that critically depend on liberty. The opposite of the corridor of liberty is the road to ruin.

A look at how new technologies can be put to use in the creation of a more just society. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not likely to make humans redundant. Nor will it create superintelligence anytime soon. But it will make huge advances in the next two decades, revolutionize medicine, entertainment, and transport, transform jobs and markets, and vastly increase the amount of information that governments and companies have about individuals. AI for Good leads off with economist and best-selling author Daron Acemoglu, who argues that there are reasons to be concerned about these developments. AI research today pays too much attention to the technological hurtles ahead without enough attention to its disruptive effects on the fabric of society: displacing workers while failing to create new opportunities for them and threatening to undermine democratic governance itself. But the direction of AI development is not preordained. Acemoglu argues for its potential to create shared prosperity and bolster democratic freedoms. But directing it to that task will take great effort: It will require new funding and regulation, new norms and priorities for developers themselves, and regulations over new technologies and their applications. At the intersection of technology and economic justice, this book will bring together experts--economists, legal scholars, policy makers, and developers--to debate these challenges and consider what steps tech companies can do take to ensure the advancement of AI does not further diminish economic prospects of the most vulnerable groups of population.

For courses in Principles of Economics. An evidence-based approach to economics Throughout Economics, 2nd Edition, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help readers learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, they use the themes of optimization, equilibrium, and empiricism to not only illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, but also to explain and predict what''s happening in today''s society. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is relevant to the life of a reader, and is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text''s practical emphasis, readers learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives. Also available with MyLab Economics MyLab(tm) Economics is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment program designed to work with this text to engage students and improve results. Within its structured environment, students practice what they learn, test their understanding, and pursue a personalized study plan that helps them better absorb course material and understand difficult concepts. Learn more. Note: You are purchasing a standalone product; MyLab Economics does not come packaged with this content. Students, if interested in purchasing this title with MyLab Economics, ask your instructor to confirm the correct package ISBN and Course ID. Instructors, contact your Pearson representative for more information. If you would like to purchase both the physical text and MyLab Economics, search for: 0134667824 / 9780134667829 Economics Plus MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package, 2/e Package consists of: 0134492064 / 9780134492063 Economics 0134519442 / 9780134519449 MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card -- for Economics

Revised edition of the authors'' Macroeconomics, [2015]

eBook - A digital book that fits your portable lifestyle and allows you to: search for key concepts, words and phrases make highlights and notes as you study share your notes with friends read on any device The eBook is downloaded to your computer and accessible either offline through the VitalSource Bookshelf (available as a free download), available online and also via the iPad/Android app. When the eBook is purchased, you will receive an email with your access code. Simply go to http://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/ to download the FREE Bookshelf software. After installation, enter your access code for your eBook. Time limit There’s no expiry date. You will continue to access your eBook whilst you have your VitalSource Bookshelf installed. Throughout Economics, 2nd Edition, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help students learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, the authors use the themes of optimization, equilibrium, and empiricism to illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, and their ability to explain, predict, and improve what happens in the world. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text’s practical emphasis, students learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives.

This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and commentaries presented at invited symposium sessions of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Shanghai in August 2010. The papers summarize and interpret key developments in economics and econometrics, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. Written by the leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline. The first volume primarily addresses economic theory, with specific focuses on nonstandard markets, contracts, decision theory, communication and organizations, epistemics and calibration, and patents.

For courses in Principles of Microeconomics Acemoglu, Laibson, List: An evidence-based approach to economics Throughout Microeconomics, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help students learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, the authors use the themes of optimization, equilibrium and empiricism to illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, and their ability to explain, predict, and improve what happens in the world. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text’s practical emphasis, students will learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives. MyEconLab is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment product designed to personalize learning and improve results. With a wide range of interactive, engaging, and assignable activities, students are encouraged to actively learn and retain tough course concepts. Please note that the product you are purchasing does not include MyEconLab. MyEconLab Join over 11 million students benefiting from Pearson MyLabs. This title can be supported by MyEconLab, an online homework and tutorial system designed to test and build your understanding. Would you like to use the power of MyEconLab to accelerate your learning? You need both an access card and a course ID to access MyEconLab. These are the steps you need to take: 1. Make sure that your lecturer is already using the system Ask your lecturer before purchasing a MyLab product as you will need a course ID from them before you can gain access to the system. 2. Check whether an access card has been included with the book at a reduced cost If it has, it will be on the inside back cover of the book. 3. If you have a course ID but no access code, you can benefit from MyEconLab at a reduced price by purchasing a pack containing a copy of the book and an access code for MyEconLab (ISBN:9781292079653) 4. If your lecturer is using the MyLab and you would like to purchase the product... Go to www.myeconlab.com to buy access to this interactive study programme. For educator access, contact your Pearson representative. To find out who your Pearson representative is, visit www.pearsoned.co.uk/replocator

Presents an alternative theory to explain the increase in both the unemployment of skilled and unskilled workers, and in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers.

Becker''s theory of human capital predicts that minimum wages should reduce training investments for affected workers, because they prevent these workers from taking wage cuts necessary to finance training. We show that when the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets underlying this theory is relaxed, minimum wages can increase training of affected workers, by inducing firms to train their unskilled employees. More generally, a minimum wage increases training for constrained workers, while reducing it for those taking wage cuts to finance their training. We provide new estimates on the impact of the state and federal increases in the minimum wage between 1987 and 1992 of the training of low wage workers. We find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training. These results are consistent with our model, but difficult to reconcile with the standard theory of human capital.

A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems. Under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions, we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness. We show how this framework can be applied in political economy, coalition formation, and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs. The explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision-making: (1) a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society; (2) efficiency-enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender.

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model a firm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payoffs from an ex post bargaining game. We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is more pronounced when there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs. We study a number of applications of the main framework and show that the mechanism proposed in the paper can generate sizable productivity differences across countries with different contracting institutions and that differences in contracting institutions lead to endogenous comparative advantage differences.

Countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies, including high inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates, appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period. Does this reflect the causal effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes? One reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak ''institutions, '' including political institutions that do not constrain politicians and political elites, ineffective enforcement of property rights for investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability. This paper documents that countries that inherited more ''extractive'' instit utions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility a nd economic crises during the postwar period. More specifically, societies where European colonists faced high mortality rates more than 100 years ago are much more volatile and prone to crises. Based on our previous work, we interpret this relationship as due to the causal effect of institutions on economic outcomes: Europeans did not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in areas where they faced high mortality. Once we control for the effect of institutions, macroeconomic policies appear to have only a minor impact on volatility and crises. This suggests that distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than the main causes of economic volatility, and also that the effects of institutional differences on volatility do not appear to be primarily mediated by any of the standard macroeconomic variables. Instead, it appears that weak institutions cause volatility through a number of microeconomic, as well as macroeconomic, channels.

The NBER Macroeconomics Annual provides a forum for important debates in contemporary macroeconomics and major developments in the theory of macroeconomic analysis and policy that include leading economists from a variety of fields. The papers and accompanying discussions in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009 address how heterogeneous beliefs interact with equilibrium leverage and potentially lead to leverage cycles, the validity of alternative hypotheses about the reason for the recent increase in foreclosures on residential mortgages, the credit rating crisis, quantitative implications for the evolution of the U.S. wage distribution, and noisy business cycles.

We show that even in the absence of diminishing returns in production and techno-logical spillovers, international trade leads to a stable world income distribution. This is because specialization and trade introduce de facto diminishing returns: countries that accumulate capital faster than average experience declining export prices, depressing the rate of return to capital and discouraging further accumulation. Because of constant re-turns to capital accumulation from a global perspective time-series behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing endogenous growth models, with the world growth rate determined by policies, savings and technologies. Because of diminishing returns to capital accumulation at the country level, the cross-sectional behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing exogenous growth models: cross-country variation in economic policies, savings and technology translate into cross-country variation in incomes, and country dynamics exhibit conditional convergence as in the Solow-Ramsey model. The dispersion of the world income distribution is determined by the forces that shape the strength of the terms of trade effects the degree of openness to international trade and the extent of specialization. Finally, we provide evidence that countries accumulating faster experience a worsening in their terms of trade. Our estimates imply that, all else equal, a 1 percentage point faster growth is associated with approximately a 0.7 percentage point decline in the terms of trade.

We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a "political replacement effect." Innovations often erode elites'' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. Keywords: Political Economy, Institutions, Development, Industrialization. JEL Classification: H2, N10, N40, O1, O3, O4

For courses in the principles of macroeconomics. An evidence-basedapproach to economics Throughout Macroeconomics,3rd Edition, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List usereal economic questions and data to help students learn about the world aroundthem. Taking a fresh approach, they use the themes of optimization,equilibrium, and empiricism to not only illustrate the power of simple economicideas, but also to explain and predict what’s happening in today’s society.Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is relevant to the life ofa student and is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economicsfeature. As a result of the text’s practical emphasis, students learn to applyeconomic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own daily lives

In contrast to the standard Beckerian theory which predicts that firms should never pay for training in skills which are equally valuable to others firms, develops a theory which explains why, in a non-competitive labour market, firms will find it profitable to invest in such general training. Investigates some of the implications of the theory using microdata from German firms with apprenticeship programmes.

In the standard model of human capital with perfect labor markets, workers pay for general training. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may invest in the general skills of their employees. The reason is that the distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into "specific" skills. Labor market frictions and institutions, such as minimum wages and union wage setting, are crucial in shaping the wage structure, and thus have an important impact on training. Our results suggest that the more frictional and regulated labor markets in Europe and Japan may generate more firm-sponsored general training than the U.S.

"This paper investigates the determinants of vertical integration using data from the UK manufacturing sector. We find that the relationship between a downstream (producer) industry and an upstream (supplier) industry is more likely to be vertically integrated when the producing industry is more technology intensive and the supplying industry is less technology intensive. Moreover, both of these effects are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer''s costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm and industry-level characteristics. They are consistent with the incomplete contract theories of the firm that emphasize both the potential costs and benefits of vertical integration in terms of investment incentives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of "kleptocrats", who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part, on their ability to use a "divide-and-rule" strategy, made possible by weakness of the institutions in these societies. Members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat, yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move, and redistributing the benefits to those who need to agree to it. Thus the collective action problem can be intensified by threats which remain off the equilibrium path. In equilibrium, all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat. Kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents; when opposition groups are shortsighted; when the average productivity in the economy is low; and when there is greater inequality between producer groups (because more productive groups are more difficult to buy off). Keywords: dictatorship, divide-and-rule, economic development, institutions, kleptocracy, personal rule, political economy. JEL Classifications: O12, H00

Study comparing wage inequality trends in the U.S. and UK (and other Anglo-Saxon countries) with trends in continental Europe. Data from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK and US are used.

"Develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development." - abstract.

NOTE: This edition features the same content as the traditional text in a convenient, three-hole-punched, loose-leaf version. Student Value Editions also offer a great value; this format costs significantly less than a new textbook. Before purchasing, check with your instructor or review your course syllabus to ensure that you select the correct ISBN. Several versions of MyLab(tm) and Mastering(tm) platforms exist for each title, including customized versions for individual schools, and registrations are not transferable. In addition, you may need a Course ID, provided by your instructor, to register for and use MyLab and Mastering platforms. For courses in Principles of Economics. Acemoglu, Laibson, List: An evidence-based approach to economics Throughout Economics, 2nd Edition, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John List use real economic questions and data to help readers learn about the world around them. Taking a fresh approach, the authors use the themes of optimization, equilibrium, and empiricism to illustrate the power of simple economic ideas, and their ability to explain, predict, and improve what happens in the world. Each chapter begins with an empirical question that is later answered using data in the Evidence-Based Economics feature. As a result of the text''s practical emphasis, readers will learn to apply economic principles to guide the decisions they make in their own lives. Also available with MyLab Economics MyLab(tm) Economics is an online homework, tutorial, and assessment program designed to work with this text to engage students and improve results. Within its structured environment, students practice what they learn, test their understanding, and pursue a personalized study plan that helps them better absorb course material and understand difficult concepts. If you would like to purchase both the loose-leaf version of the text and MyLab Economics, search for: 0134641892 / 9780134641898 Economics, Student Value Edition Plus MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package Package consists of: 0134515625 / 9780134515625 Economics, Student Value Edition 0134519442 / 9780134519449 MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card -- for Economics