Best Selling Books by Daron Acemoglu

Von den Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträgern 2024 Wie viel Staat muss sein? Nach dem internationalen Bestseller »Warum Nationen scheitern?« widmen sich Starökonom Daron Acemoglu und Harvard-Politologe James A. Robinson in ihrem neuen Buch dieser fundamentalen Frage. Auseinandersetzungen zwischen rivalisierenden Milizen in Libyen, Einschränkung der Presse- und Demonstrationsfreiheit in der Türkei, Umerziehungslager in Nordkorea. Gegenwärtig erleben wir viele Staaten als problematisch: sie sind entweder gescheitert, überreguliert oder despotisch. Aber wie viel Staat ist denn eigentlich notwendig? Die Autoren geben hierauf eine überraschende und provokante Antwort. Anhand zahlreicher historischer und aktueller Beispiele – vom antiken Griechenland über Deutschland im Nationalsozialismus bis zum heutigen China – zeigen sie: Wohlstand, Sicherheit und Freiheit sind in hohem Maße von dem richtigen Rahmen abhängig, in dem der ewige Kampf um Macht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft ausgetragen wird. Eine überzeugende Analyse, die demonstriert: Ein starker Staat und eine starke Gesellschaft sind kein Widerspruch, sondern bedingen sich gegenseitig.

La libertad no es el orden natural de la humanidad. En la mayoría de lugares y de épocas, los fuertes han dominado a los débiles y la libertad ha sido aplastada por la fuerza o por las costumbres y las normas. A menudo los Estados no han tenido la suficiente capacidad para proteger a los individuos o, por el contrario, han sido tan fuertes que la gente no ha podido defenderse de su despotismo. La libertad sólo surge cuando se logra un equilibrio delicado y frágil entre el Estado y la sociedad. El pasillo que lleva a la libertad es estrecho y sólo puede recorrerse si se produce una lucha constante entre el Estado y la sociedad. Pero, ¿en qué consiste esa lucha? En un recorrido fascinante que nos lleva del mundo árabe en tiempos de Mahoma a las ciudades-Estado de la Italia medieval, de la Latinoamérica de las dictaduras a la Suecia que inventó la socialdemocracia, de la caótica República de Weimar a la China imperial, El pasillo estrecho nos introduce en el que tal vez sea el proceso más fascinante de la historia: el de la obtención de la libertad. Una libertad que solo puede existir cuando la sociedad cuestiona el poder del Estado y de las élites, pero también cuando, al mismo tiempo, existe un Estado robusto capaz de defender nuestros derechos cuando estos se ven amenazados. ¿Por qué algunas sociedades han conquistado la libertad y otras se ven sometidas a tiranías o regímenes incompetentes?

"«Chi si allontana dal gruppo è preda del falco» recita un proverbio del popolo ashanti: il mondo è crudele e i forti hanno sempre oppresso i deboli con la violenza. In assenza di un''autorità centrale l''unica protezione è rifugiarsi in una gabbia – spesso opprimente – di norme, tradizioni e alleanze tra clan. Viceversa, uno Stato forte può proteggere gli individui, ma rischia di mutarsi in un mostro, in una dittatura oppressiva. Per gran parte della storia umana, in ogni luogo e tempo, la libertà non è stata qualcosa di scontato e naturale, ma una conquista sofferta ottenuta solo imboccando una vera e propria strettoia. Questo corridoio virtuoso esiste quando i poteri dello Stato e della società sono in equilibrio: quando le istituzioni sono forti, in grado di fornire servizi e far rispettare le leggi; e quando, al tempo stesso, i cittadini hanno la capacità di tenere sotto controllo e chiamare in causa le autorità. La strettoia analizza il modo in cui le nazioni sono riuscite a bilanciare queste due forze in equilibrio precario. Ripercorre la via attraverso cui alcune sono entrate nel corridoio della libertà e altre ne sono rimaste fuori o ne sono dolorosamente uscite. Esplora la storia della democrazia in Grecia, della nascita degli Stati Uniti e di quella delle nazioni create da Maometto e Shaka a partire da terre e popoli divisi. Traccia le origini di un''Europa dai molteplici centri di potere e di una Cina dominata da un''autorità centrale, con i loro percorsi drammaticamente diversi. Indaga le radici del fallimento di molte rivoluzioni nel Medio Oriente e delle speranze per il futuro dell''Africa. Dopo il best seller Perché le nazioni falliscono, Acemoglu e Robinson aggiungono un nuovo tassello fondamentale al loro grande mosaico che ritrae la storia delle società umane. E ci ricordano, oggi più che mai, che la libertà non è dovuta, ma è una vittoria che dipende da un fragile equilibrio di forze, in bilico tra il caos e l''oppressione."

Cos''è davvero il progresso? Nel corso della storia dell''umanità, il cambiamento tecnologico – che si tratti dei miglioramenti agricoli nel Medioevo, della Rivoluzione industriale o dell''odierna intelligenza artificiale – è stato visto come il principale motore della prosperità, qualcosa da cui avremmo tratto solo vantaggi. La realtà, però, si è sempre rivelata più complessa. Nel XIX secolo, l''introduzione della sgranatrice aumentò enormemente la produttività della coltivazione di cotone e trasformò gli Stati Uniti nel suo primo esportatore mondiale, ma allo stesso modo intensificò la ferocia dello schiavismo e della segregazione razziale. A partire da esempi come questo e guardando alla contemporaneità, Daron Acemoglu e Simon Johnson sfatano il mito del tecnottimismo moderno. È vero: ce la passiamo enormemente meglio dei nostri antenati, ma gli ultimi mille anni hanno visto la diffusione di invenzioni che non hanno affatto portato al benessere collettivo e i risultati sono sotto i nostri occhi. Una visione nuova e più inclusiva della tecnologia potrà emergere solo se prendiamo coscienza del nostro potere sociale, lottando per fare in modo che le innovazioni siano al servizio di tutti. Acemoglu e Johnson scrivono un manifesto per una società migliore, insistendo sulla necessità di assicurarci che la tecnologia crei nuovi posti di lavoro e nuove opportunità, anziché emarginare la maggior parte delle persone, attraverso il lavoro automatizzato e la passività politica. Solo così potremo realizzare il vero potenziale del progresso, ripensando la teoria economica in modo rivoluzionario.

Vrijheid is niet vanzelfsprekend, vroeger niet, en nog steeds niet. Maar in deze tijd van destabilisering op vele terreinen hebben we vrijheid hard nodig. Niet ''alleen'' verlies van politieke vrijheid is wat dreigt, ook onze welvaart en veiligheid is in gevaar. Vrijheid is een delicaat evenwicht tussen staat en samenleving, tussen de economische, politieke en sociale elite en gewone burgers. Als de balans doorslaat komt de vrijheid in gevaar. Voor vrijheid zijn instellingen nodig die zich permanent vernieuwen om economische en sociale uitdagingen aan te kunnen. Vrijheid is sterk afhankelijk van een waakzame samenleving. Wankel evenwicht is een fascinerende zoektocht, over de hele wereld en door de eeuwen heen, naar wat vrijheid eigenlijk is. De pers over Waarom sommige landen rijk zijn en andere arm: ''Dit bijzonder toegankelijke boek biedt zowel specialisten als algemeen geïnteresseerden verrassend nieuwe inzichten.'' Francis Fukuyama ''Een fascinerend boek.'' Thomas Friedman ''Acemoglu en Robinson hebben een boeiend en zeer lezenswaardig boek geschreven.'' Niall Ferguson ''Verdient te worden gelezen door politici en economen, waar ook ter wereld.'' Het Financieele Dagblad

Sử dụng lịch sử Đông-Tây kim-cổ đã diễn ra trên tất cả các châu lục của trái đất này, hai tác giả lập luận rằng những quốc gia thất bại là những đất nước bị cai trị bởi một nhóm quyền thế tập trung, và những nhóm này đã tổ chức xã hội để phục vụ cho quyền lợi riêng của họ trong khi đại đa số quần chúng nhân dân phải trả giá. Thế lực chính trị bị tập trung trong một nhóm nhỏ, được sử dụng để tạo ra tài sản khổng lồ cho những người nắm giữ quyền lực. Trong khi đó, những nước trở nên giàu có là vì người dân nước đó lật đổ giới quyền thế, những người kiểm soát quyền lực, và tạo ra một xã hội trong đó các quyền chính trị được phân phối rộng rãi, trong đó chính phủ có trách nhiệm giải trình và phải đáp ứng trước công dân, và trong đó đại đa số quần chúng có thể tranh thủ các cơ hội kinh tế. Tóm lại, điều cuốn sách muốn nhắm đến là thể chế nào có những điều chỉnh, cải cách để dung hợp được các lợi ích kinh tế-chính trị và tạo điều kiện cho người dân làm ăn sinh sống được tốt nhất sẽ thành công. Như sách đã chỉ ra, ngay như Trung Quốc, khi họ giải quyết được phần nào đó sự dung hợp này, họ đã có sự tăng trưởng thần kỳ. Và giờ đây họ vẫn tiếp tục giải quyết bài toán thể chế dung hợp của họ.

Throughout history, the advantages and costs of technological innovations have been unevenly distributed between the powerful and the rest of society, assert economists Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson in their new book, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. In a Q&A, they discuss what’s wrong with today’s approach to automation, why machine usefulness is more important than machine intelligence, and what techno-optimists and -pessimists both get wrong.

Pourquoi certains pays sont-ils riches et d’autres pauvres ? Est-ce dû à la culture, au climat, à la géographie ? Ou est-ce le résultat de l’ignorance des dirigeants politiques ? Acemoglu et Robinson montrent à l’aide de nombreux exemples que ces réponses ne tiennent pas la route. L’histoire et l’analyse économique suggèrent une explication différente : c’est la présence ou l’absence de certaines institutions politiques et économiques qui assurent ou empêchent le progrès vers la prospérité. Des institutions «extractives» – protégeant les intérêts d’une élite puissante au dépens du bien commun – aux institutions «inclusives» – qui posent des limites à influence des puissants, éliminent la discrimination et favorisent l’innovation – le passage est parsemé d’obstacles. Acemoglu et Robinson les analysent en détail, s’appuyant sur un éventail impressionnant d’exemples, tirés de l’histoire de l’Empire romain, des cités-états mayas, de la Venise médiévale, de l’Union soviétique, de l’Amérique latine, de l’Afrique et des pays occidentaux. Ils élaborent ainsi une nouvelle synthèse de l’économie politique d’une pertinence indéniable pour les grands défis politiques et économiques d’aujourd’hui.

This paper shows that large economic downturns may result from the propagation of micro-economic shocks over the input-output linkages across different firms or sectors within the economy. Building on the framework of Acemoglu et al. (2012), we argue that the economy''s input-output structure can fundamentally reshape the distribution of aggregate output, increasing the likelihood of large downturns from infinitesimal to substantial. More specifically, we show that an economy with non-trivial inter-sectoral input-output linkages that is subject to thin-tailed productivity shocks may exhibit deep recessions as frequently as economies that are subject to heavy-tailed shocks. Moreover, we show that in the presence of input-output linkages, aggregate volatility is not necessarily a sufficient statistic for the likelihood of large downturns. Rather, depending on the shape of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, different features of the economy''s input-output network may be of first-order importance. Finally, our results establish that the effects of the economy''s input-output structure and the nature of the idiosyncratic firm level shocks on aggregate output are not separable, in the sense that the likelihood of large economic downturns is determined by the interplay between the two. Keywords: input-output networks, aggregate output, business cycles, economic downturns. JEL Classification: C67, E32.

"We revisit one of the central empirical findings of the political economy literature that higher income per capita causes democracy. Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, but do not typically control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We also present instrumental-variables using two different strategies. These estimates also show no causal effect of income on democracy. Furthermore, we reconcile the positive cross-country correlation between income and democracy with the absence of a causal effect of income on democracy by showing that the long-run evolution of income and democracy is related to historical factors. Consistent with this, the positive correlation between income and democracy disappears, even without fixed effects, when we control for the historical determinants of economic and political development in a sample of former European colonies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

This paper proposes a tractable model to study the equilibrium diversity of technological progress and shows that equilibrium technological progress may exhibit too little diversity (too much conformity), in particular foregoing socially beneficial investments in "alternative" technologies that will be used at some point in the future. The presence of future innovations that will replace current innovations imply that social benefits from innovation are not fully internalized. As a consequence, the market favors technologies that generate current gains relative to those that will bear fruit in the future; current innovations in research lines that will be profitable in the future are discouraged because current innovations are typically followed by further innovations before they can be profitably marketed. A social planner would choose a more diverse research portfolio and would induce a higher growth rate than the equilibrium allocation. The diversity of researchers is a partial (imperfect) remedy against the mis-allocation induced by the market. Researchers with different interests, competences or ideas may choose non-profit maximizing and thus more diverse research portfolios, indirectly contributing to economic growth. Keywords: Economic growth, diversity, innovation, research, science, technological change. JEL Classifications: O30, O31, O33, C65.

Thomas Piketty''s (2013) book, Capital in the 21st Century, follows in the tradition of the great classical economists, like Marx and Ricardo, in formulating general laws of capitalism to diagnose and predict the dynamics of inequality. We argue that general economic laws are unhelpful as a guide to understand the past or predict the future, because they ignore the central role of political and economic institutions, as well as the endogenous evolution of technology, in shaping the distribution of resources in society. We use regression evidence to show that the main economic force emphasized in Piketty''s book, the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate, does not appear to explain historical patterns of inequality (especially, the share of income accruing to the upper tail of the distribution). We then use the histories of inequality of South Africa and Sweden to illustrate that inequality dynamics cannot be understood without embedding economic factors in the context of economic and political institutions, and also that the focus on the share of top incomes can give a misleading characterization of the true nature of inequality. Keywords: Capitalism, Inequality, Institutions. JEL Classification: P16, P48, O20.

I discuss the role of economic theory in empirical work in development economics with special emphasis on general equilibrium and political economy considerations. I argue that economic theory plays (should play) a central role in formulating models, estimates of which can be used for counterfactual and policy analysis. I discuss why counterfactual analysis based on microdata that ignores general equilibrium and political economy issues may lead to misleading conclusions. I illustrate the main arguments using examples from recent work in development economics and political economy. Keywords: economic development, economic theory, methodology of economics, political. JEL Classifications: O10, O12, B41, D50, P48.

Robert Gordon''s The Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth provides a compelling interpretation of how technical change and innovation has radically changed the living standards of the citizens of the US in the past 150 years. Lying behind these changes are the institutions which have allowed the country to harness its human potential. In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of one key set of institutions, the capacity of the US state as proxied by the presence of post offices in a county, on innovation. We show that between 1804 and 1899, the time when the US became the world technological leader, there is a strong association between the presence and number of post offices in a county and patenting activity, and it appears that it is the opening of postal offices that leads to surges in patenting activity, not the other way around. Our evidence suggests that part of the yet untold story of US technological exceptionalism is the way in which the US created an immensely capable and effective state.

ciently forward-looking.

This paper documents that the Rise of (Western) Europe between 1500 and 1850 is largely accounted for by the growth of European nations with access to the Atlantic, and especially by those nations that engaged in colonialism and long distance oceanic trade. Moreover, Atlantic ports grew much faster than other West European cities, including Mediterranean ports. Atlantic trade and colonialism affected Europe both directly, and indirectly by inducing institutional changes. In particular, the growth of New World, African, and Asian trade after 1500 strengthened new segments of the commercial bourgeoisie, and enabled these groups to demand, obtain, and sustain changes in institutions to protect their property rights. Furthermore, the most significant institutional changes and consequently the most substantial economic gains occurred in nations where existing institutions placed some checks on the monarchy and particularly limited its control of overseas trading activities, thus enabling new merchants in these countries to benefit from Atlantic trade. Therefore, the Rise of Europe was largely the result of capitalist development driven by the interaction of late medieval institutions and the economic opportunities offered by "Atlantic trade." Keywords: Capitalism, Economic Growth, Institutions, Political Economy, Social Conflict, Trade. JEL Classifications: O10, F10, P10, N13.

Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014) argue that the results in Acemoglu and Johnson (2006, 2007) are not robust because initial level of life expectancy (in 1940) should be included in our regressions of changes in GDP per capita on changes in life expectancy. We assess their claims controlling for potential lagged effects of initial life expectancy using data from 1900, employing a nonlinear estimator suggested by their framework, and using information from microeconomic estimates on the effects of improving health. There is no evidence for a positive effect of life expectancy on GDP per capita in this important historical episode.

We study the evolution of a social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents'' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly-observed past behaviors. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is a pattern of "reversion" whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional "prominent" agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. Keywords: cooperation, coordination, expectations, history, leadership, overlap- ping generations, repeated games, social norms. JEL classification: C72, C73, D7, P16, Z1.

We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia. Keywords: democracy, de facto power, de jure power, dictatorship, elites, institutions, labor repression, persistence, political economy. JEL Classifications: H2, N10, N40, P16.

The propagation of macroeconomic shocks through input-output and geographic networks can be a powerful driver of macroeconomic fluctuations. We first exposit that in the presence of Cobb-Douglas production functions and consumer preferences, there is a specific pattern of economic transmission whereby demand-side shocks propagate upstream (to input-supplying industries) and supply-side shocks propagate downstream (to customer industries) and that there is a tight relationship between the direct impact of a shock and the magnitudes of the downstream and the upstream indirect effects. We then investigate the short-run propagation of four different types of industry-level shocks: two demand-side ones (the exogenous component of the variation in industry imports from China and changes in federal spending) and two supply side ones (TFP shocks and variation in knowledge/ideas coming from foreign patenting). In each case, we find substantial propagation of these shocks through the input-output network, with a pattern broadly consistent with theory. Quantitatively, the network-based propagation is larger than the direct effects of the shocks. We also show quantitatively large effects from the geographic network, capturing the fact that the local propagation of a shock to an industry will fall more heavily on other industries that tend to collocate with it across local markets. Our results suggest that the transmission of various different types of shocks through economic networks and industry interlinkages could have first-order implications for the macroeconomy. Keywords: Economic fluctuations, geographic collocation, input-output linkages, networks, propagation, shocks. JEL Classification: E32.