Most Popular Books by Simon Johnson

Start Good Days Start with Gratitude is a 50days guide to cultivate an attitude of gratitude! Start each day by writing down three things you are thankful Do it daily and make it a habit to focus on the blessings you have been given! Grab a copy for a friend and share the journey together This book is a self exploration journal designed to focus on being thankful for what we have, the good things in life, as well as the simple joys.

The French Revolution of 1789 had a momentous impact on neighboring countries. The French Revolutionary armies during the 1790s and later under Napoleon invaded and controlled large parts of Europe. Together with invasion came various radical institutional changes. French invasion removed the legal and economic barriers that had protected the nobility, clergy, guilds, and urban oligarchies and established the principle of equality before the law. The evidence suggests that areas that were occupied by the French and that underwent radical institutional reform experienced more rapid urbanization and economic growth, especially after 1850. There is no evidence of a negative effect of French invasion. Our interpretation is that the Revolution destroyed (the institutional underpinnings of) the power of oligarchies and elites opposed to economic change; combined with the arrival of new economic and industrial opportunities in the second half of the 19th century, this helped pave the way for future economic growth. The evidence does not provide any support for several other views, most notably, that evolved institutions are inherently superior to those 'designed'; that institutions must be 'appropriate' and cannot be 'transplanted'; and that the civil code and other French institutions have adverse economic effects.

Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal is inconsistent with a view that links economic development to geographic factors. According to the geography view, societies that were relatively rich in 1500 should also be relatively rich today. In contrast, the reversal is consistent with the role of institutions in economic development. The expansion of European overseas empires starting in the 15th century led to a major change in the institutions of the societies they colonized. In fact, the European intervention appears to have created an 'institutional reversal' among these societies, in the sense that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the 19th century, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of industrialization opportunities.

We present a novel method for calibrating pricing models to incorporate the effects of the volatility Smile and its dynamics. This is made possible by simultaneously calibrating to the Smile surface of European options as well as to prices of Barrier options which encapsulate information on the Smile dynamics. An arbitrary combination of European and simple exotics may be calibrated to without over-fitting or resorting to non-stationary model parameters. This technique has a natural analogy with classical statistical mechanics, and also allows analytic derivation of hedge ratios. Numerical implementation of the calibration method utilises Monte Carlo and PDE approaches and we present results to illustrate its practical use and effectiveness.

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Children in many extremely poor, remote regions are growing up illiterate and innumerate despite high reported school enrollment ratios. Possible explanations for such poor outcomes include demand - for example, low perceived returns to education compared to opportunity cost; and supply - poor state provision and inability of parents to coordinate and finance better schooling. We conducted a cluster-randomized trial in rural Guinea Bissau to understand the effectiveness and cost of concerted supply-based interventions in such contexts. Our intervention created simple schools offering four years of education to primary-school aged children in lieu of the government. At endline, children receiving the intervention scored 58.1 percentage points better than controls on early grade reading and math tests, demonstrating that the intervention taught children to read and perform basic arithmetic, from a counterfactual condition of very high illiteracy. Our results provide evidence that particularly needy areas may require more concerted, dramatic interventions in education than those usually considered, but that such interventions hold great potential for increasing education levels among the world's poorest people.

Start Good Days Start with Gratitude is a 50days guide to cultivate an attitude of gratitude! Start each day by writing down three things you are thankful Do it daily and make it a habit to focus on the blessings you have been given! Grab a copy for a friend and share the journey together This book is a self exploration journal designed to focus on being thankful for what we have, the good things in life, as well as the simple joys.

We model policy reform as a way to affect the stochastic process of relative returns that firms face when switching from old to new activities. This stochastic process has an Ito process component that is noncontrollable and policy reforms result in jumps in relative returns that arrive according to a Poisson process. The intensity of policy reform depends on the arrival rate and magnitude of jumps. We use a single firm model to understand the reaction of the firm to such a stochastic process and the usual hysteresis results in switching between old and new activities. Aggregation to the level of all firms leads to an appropriate definition of the government payoff function, and we use this to obtain the optimal level of reform. The results are as follows: there exists and optimal level of radical reform that overcomes the hysteresis behavior of firms; if such a level is not desirable, then the intensity of policy reform is not an extreme point; and this gradual level of optimal reform is lower if uncertainty is higher.

"The scale of destruction in Ukraine is already staggering. A new CEPR publication builds on prior experiences with reconstruction following both wars and natural disasters to outline some principles for the future reconstruction of Ukraine. Efforts should include putting the country on the path to EU accession; establishing a stand-alone EU-authorised agency with autonomy to coordinate and manage aid and reconstruction programmes; recognising that Ukraine must own its reconstruction; encouraging inflows of foreign capital and technology transfers; a focus on grants rather than loans; and rebuilding around the principle of a zero-carbon future."--Abstract.

What is the effect of increasing life expectancy on economic growth? To answer this question, we exploit the international epidemiological transition, the wave of international health innovations and improvements that began in the 1940s. We obtain estimates of mortality by disease before the 1940s from the League of Nations and national public health sources. Using these data, we construct an instrument for changes in life expectancy, referred to as predicted mortality, which is based on the pre-intervention distribution of mortality from various diseases around the world and dates of global interventions. We document that predicted mortality has a large and robust effect on changes in life expectancy starting in 1940, but no effect on changes in life expectancy before the interventions. The instrumented changes in life expectancy have a large effect on population; a 1% increase in life expectancy leads to an increase in population of about 1.5%. Life expectancy has a much smaller effect on total GDP both initially and over a 40-year horizon, however. Consequently, there is no evidence that the large exogenous increase in life expectancy led to a significant increase in per capita economic growth. These results confirm that global efforts to combat poor health conditions in less developed countries can be highly effective, but also shed doubt on claims that unfavorable health conditions are the root cause of the poverty of some nations.

The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small network of financial sector executives during a time of acute crisis and heightened policy discretion.

In this paper we look at two areas in the interest rate options market where arbitrage could be hiding. In the first section we derive a no-arbitrage condition for swaption prices with complementary expiry dates and tenors within the swaption cube. In the second section we propose an alternative European option approximation for the widely used SABR dynamics that reduces the possibility of arbitrage for long maturities and low strikes.

Medical and public health innovations in the 1940s quickly resulted in significant health improvements around the world. Countries with initially higher mortality from infectious diseases experienced greater increases in life expectancy, population, and -- over the following 40 years -- social conflict. This result is robust across alternative measures of conflict and is not driven by differential trends between countries with varying baseline characteristics. At least during this time period, a faster increase in population made social conflict more likely, probably because it increased competition for scarce resources in low income countries. Keywords: civil war, population growth. JEL Classification: J1, 011, O15, Q56.

Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker. While these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies, in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy. The problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se, but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption. A high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy.

The conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy. This paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on cross-sectional correlations, which disappear once we look at within-country variation. In other words, there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic.

Families run a large fraction of business groups around the world. In this paper, we analyze how the structure of the families behind these business groups affects the groups' organization, governance and performance. To address this question, we constructed a unique data set of family trees and business groups for nearly 100 of the largest business families in Thailand. We find a strong positive association between family size and family involvement in the ownership and control of the family business. The sons of the founders play a central role in both ownership and board membership, especially when the founder of the group is gone. The availability of more sons is also associated with lower firm-level performance, especially when the founder is no longer present. We identify a possible governance channel for this performance effect. Excess control by sons, but not other family members, is associated with lower firm performance. In addition, excess control by sons increases with the number of sons and with the death of the founder. One hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that part of the decay of family-run groups over time may be due to a dilution of ownership and control across a set of equally powerful descendants of the founder, which creates a race to the bottom in tunneling resources out of the group firms.

Post-communist countries offer new evidence on the relative importance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new relationships between firms and their customers. Well-functioning courts also encourage entrepreneurs to try out new suppliers. Courts are particularly important when specific investments are needed for a relationship to develop. While relationships can sustain existing interactions, workable courts help new interactions to start and develop

This paper evaluates the importance of "property rights institutions," which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and "contracting institutions," which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history, and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization), and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we find that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often find ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse effects of contracting institutions, but are unable to do so against the risk of expropriation. Keywords: Contracts, Economic Growth, Financial Development, Institutions, Law and Finance, Legal Formalism, Legal Origin, Political Economy, Politics, Property Rights. JEL Classification: E44, G18, K00, N20, P16, P17.

This paper sheds light on two problems in the Penn World Table (PWT) GDP estimates. First, we show that these estimates vary substantially across different versions of the PWT despite being derived from very similar underlying data and using almost identical methodologies; that this variability is systematic; and that it is intrinsic to the methodology deployed by the PWT to estimate growth rates. Moreover, this variability matters for the cross-country growth literature. While growth studies that use low frequency data remain robust to data revisions, studies that use annual data are less robust. Second, the PWT methodology leads to GDP estimates that are not valued at purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. This is surprising because the raison d'etre of the PWT is to adjust national estimates of GDP by valuing output at common international (purchasing power parity [PPP]) prices so that the resulting PPP-adjusted estimates of GDP are comparable across countries. We propose an approach to address these two problems of variability and valuation.