New Releases by James A. Robinson

Robert Gordon''s The Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth provides a compelling interpretation of how technical change and innovation has radically changed the living standards of the citizens of the US in the past 150 years. Lying behind these changes are the institutions which have allowed the country to harness its human potential. In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of one key set of institutions, the capacity of the US state as proxied by the presence of post offices in a county, on innovation. We show that between 1804 and 1899, the time when the US became the world technological leader, there is a strong association between the presence and number of post offices in a county and patenting activity, and it appears that it is the opening of postal offices that leads to surges in patenting activity, not the other way around. Our evidence suggests that part of the yet untold story of US technological exceptionalism is the way in which the US created an immensely capable and effective state.

We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision are absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization.

Pourquoi certains pays sont-ils riches et d’autres pauvres ? Est-ce dû à la culture, au climat, à la géographie ? Ou est-ce le résultat de l’ignorance des dirigeants politiques ? Acemoglu et Robinson montrent à l’aide de nombreux exemples que ces réponses ne tiennent pas la route. L’histoire et l’analyse économique suggèrent une explication différente : c’est la présence ou l’absence de certaines institutions politiques et économiques qui assurent ou empêchent le progrès vers la prospérité. Des institutions «extractives» – protégeant les intérêts d’une élite puissante au dépens du bien commun – aux institutions «inclusives» – qui posent des limites à influence des puissants, éliminent la discrimination et favorisent l’innovation – le passage est parsemé d’obstacles. Acemoglu et Robinson les analysent en détail, s’appuyant sur un éventail impressionnant d’exemples, tirés de l’histoire de l’Empire romain, des cités-états mayas, de la Venise médiévale, de l’Union soviétique, de l’Amérique latine, de l’Afrique et des pays occidentaux. Ils élaborent ainsi une nouvelle synthèse de l’économie politique d’une pertinence indéniable pour les grands défis politiques et économiques d’aujourd’hui.

We document that rules for leadership succession in ethnic societies that antedate the modern state predict contemporary political regimes; leadership selection by election in indigenous societies is associated with contemporary representative democracy. The basic association, however, is conditioned on the relative strength of the indigenous groups within a country; stronger groups seem to have been able to shape national regime trajectories, weaker groups do not. This finding extends and qualifies a substantive qualitative literature, which has found in local democratic institutions of medieval Europe a positive impulse towards the development of representative democracy. It shows that contemporary regimes are shaped not only by colonial history and European influence; indigenous history also matters. For practitioners, our findings suggest that external reformers'' capacity for regime-building should not be exaggerated.

We develop a model of the political consequences of public income volatility. As is standard, political incentives create inefficient policies, but we show that making income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy less costly. We show how this model can help think about the connection between volatility and economic growth and in the case where volatility comes from volatile natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself is a source of inefficient resource extraction.

We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force and military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule-following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain.

We use a variant of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to examine individuals'' implicit attitudes towards various ethnic groups. Using a population from the Democratic Republic of Congo, we find that the IAT measures show evidence of an implicit bias in favor of one''s own ethnicity. Individuals have implicit views of their own ethnic group that are more positive than their implicit views of other ethnic groups. We find this implicit bias to be quantitatively smaller than the (explicit) bias one finds when using self-reported attitudes about different ethnic groups.

Earth has been attacked! In the shadow of the dark forces more powerful than the planet has ever seen, the greatest superhumans have failed. Before all is lost, a new breed of heroes must unite and combat the insidious evil invading the Earth. Who can be trusted?

¿Qué determina que un país sea rico o pobre? ¿Cómo se explica que, en condiciones similares, en algunos países haya hambrunas y en otros no? ¿Qué papel tiene la política en estas cuestiones? Que algunas naciones sean más prósperas que otras, ¿se debe a cuestiones culturales?, ¿a los efectos de la climatología?, ¿a su ubicación geográfica? No, en absoluto. Ninguna cuestión relativa a la prosperidad de un país está relacionada con estos factores, sino que proviene de otro mucho más tangible: la política económica que dictaminan sus dirigentes. Son los líderes de cada país, afirman los reconocidos profesores Daron Acemoglu y James A. Robinson en este libro, quienes determinan con sus políticas la prosperidad de su territorio, y así ha ocurrido en todos los períodos de la historia, como demuestran en este apasionante estudio.

Thomas Piketty''s (2013) book, Capital in the 21st Century, follows in the tradition of the great classical economists, like Marx and Ricardo, in formulating general laws of capitalism to diagnose and predict the dynamics of inequality. We argue that general economic laws are unhelpful as a guide to understand the past or predict the future, because they ignore the central role of political and economic institutions, as well as the endogenous evolution of technology, in shaping the distribution of resources in society. We use regression evidence to show that the main economic force emphasized in Piketty''s book, the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate, does not appear to explain historical patterns of inequality (especially, the share of income accruing to the upper tail of the distribution). We then use the histories of inequality of South Africa and Sweden to illustrate that inequality dynamics cannot be understood without embedding economic factors in the context of economic and political institutions, and also that the focus on the share of top incomes can give a misleading characterization of the true nature of inequality. Keywords: Capitalism, Inequality, Institutions. JEL Classification: P16, P48, O20.

In this paper we revisit the relationship between institutions, human capital and development. We argue that empirical models that treat institutions and human capital as exogenous are misspecified both because of the usual omitted variable bias problems and because of differential measurement error in these variables, and that this misspecification is at the root of the very large returns of human capital, about 4 to 5 times greater than that implied by micro (Mincerian) estimates, found in some of the previous literature. Using cross-country and cross-regional regressions, we show that when we focus on historically-determined differences in human capital and control for the effect of institutions, the impact of institutions on long-run development is robust, while the estimates of the effect of human capital are much diminished and become consistent with micro estimates. Using historical and cross-country regression evidence, we also show that there is no support for the view that differences in the human capital endowments of early European colonists have been a major factor in the subsequent institutional development of these polities. Keywords: Economic Development, Institutions, Human Capital. JEL Classification: I25, P16, O10.

Der Klassiker – von den Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträgern 2024, eine Pflichtlektüre! Warum sind Nationen reich oder arm? Starökonom Daron Acemoglu und Harvard-Politologe James Robinson geben eine ebenso schlüssige wie eindrucksvolle Antwort auf diese grundlegende Frage. Anhand zahlreicher, faszinierender Fallbeispiele – von den Conquistadores über die Industrielle Revolution bis zum heutigen China, von Sierra Leone bis Kolumbien – zeigen sie, mit welcher Macht die Eliten mittels repressiver Institutionen sämtliche Regeln zu ihren Gunsten manipulieren - zum Schaden der vielen Einzelnen. Ein spannendes und faszinierendes Plädoyer dafür, dass Geschichte und Geographie kein Schicksal sind. Und ein überzeugendes Beispiel, dass die richtige Analyse der Vergangenheit neue Wege zum Verständnis unserer Gegenwart und neue Perspektiven für die Zukunft eröffnet. Ein provokatives, brillantes und einzigartiges Buch. »Dieses Buch werden unsere Ur-Ur-Urenkel in zweihundert Jahren noch lesen.« George Akerlof, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Eine absolut überzeugende Studie.« Gary S. Becker, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Ein wirklich wichtiges Buch.« Michael Spence, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Acemoglu und Robinson begeistern und regen zum Nachdenken an.« Robert Solow, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Ein wichtiges, unverzichtbares Werk.« Peter Diamond, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Debatte, warum Staaten mit gleicher Vorrausetzung sich so wesentlich in wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklungen unterscheiden.« Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften »Diese faktenreiche und ermutigende Streitschrift lehrt uns, dass die Geschichte glücklich enden kann, wenn ihr kein Mensch mehr als Versuchsobjekt dient.« Michael Holmes, NZZ am Sonntag »Anderthalb Jahrzehnte Arbeit eines Pools von Wissenschaftlern, auf 600 Seiten zusammengefasst durch zwei Forscher von Weltrang – und dies kommt heraus: eine Liebeserklärung an Institutionen, die im Sinne ihrer Bürger funktionieren. [...] bestechend.« Elisabeth von Thadden, Die Zeit »Sie werden von diesem Buch begeistert sein.« Jared Diamond, Pulitzer Preisträger und Autor der Weltbestseller »Kollaps« und »Arm und Reich« » Ein höchst lesenswertes Buch.« Francis Fukuyama, Autor des Bestsellers »Das Ende der Geschichte« »Ein phantastisches Buch. Acemoglu und Robinson gehen das wichtigste Problem der Sozialwissenschaften an – eine Frage, die führende Denker seit Jahrhunderten plagt – und liefern eine in ihrer Einfachheit und Wirkmächtigkeit brillante Antwort. Eine wunderbar lesbare Mischung aus Geschichte, Politikwissenschaft und Ökonomie, die unser Denken verändern wird. Pflichtlektüre.« Steven Levitt, Autor von »Freakonomics«

Earth 2: an alternate reality where the Crime Syndicate of Amerika, made up of the world''s gravest super-villains, holds absolute power.

"After a brutal attempt on his life, the Shade leaves Opal City to learn which of the many people he has crossed are responsible. Joining forces with allies such as private detective Will von Hammer and teenaged vampire La Sangre, the Shade begins a centuries-spanning quest that takes him from Australia to Barcelona to London, facing off against lizard gods, celestial pharaohs, and even family members ..."--Page 4 of cover.

In this paper we revisit the relationship between democracy, redistribution and inequality. We first explain the theoretical reasons why democracy is expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why this expectation may fail to be realized when democracy is captured by the richer segments of the population; when it caters to the preferences of the middle class; or when it opens up disequalizing opportunities to segments of the population previously excluded from such activities, thus exacerbating inequality among a large part of the population. We then survey the existing empirical literature, which is both voluminous and full of contradictory results. We provide new and systematic reduced-form evidence on the dynamic impact of democracy on various outcomes. Our findings indicate that there is a significant and robust effect of democracy on tax revenues as a fraction of GDP, but no robust impact on inequality. We also find that democracy is associated with an increase in secondary schooling and a more rapid structural transformation. Finally, we provide some evidence suggesting that inequality tends to increase after democratization when the economy has already undergone significant structural transformation, when land inequality is high, and when the gap between the middle class and the poor is small. All of these are broadly consistent with a view that is different from the traditional median voter model of democratic redistribution: democracy does not lead to a uniform decline in post-tax inequality, but can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that have ambiguous effects on inequality. Keywords: democracy, education, inequality, political development, redistribution, structural transformation. JEL Classification: P16, O10 .

In this paper we investigate the empirical correlates of political centralization using data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. We specifically investigate the explanatory power of the standard models of Eurasian state formation which emphasize the importance of high population density, inter-state warfare and trade as factors leading to political centralization. We find that while in the whole world sample these factors are indeed positively correlated with political centralization, this is not so in the African sub-sample. Indeed, none of the variables are statistically related to political centralization. We also provide evidence that political centralization, where it took place, was indeed associated with better public goods and development outcomes. We conclude that the evidence is quite consistent with the intellectual tradition initiated in social anthropology by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes in the 1940s which denied the utility of Eurasian models in explaining patterns of political centralization in Africa.

Nogales (Arizona) y Nogales (Sonora) tienen la misma población, cultura y situación geográfica. ¿Por qué una es rica y otra pobre? ¿Por qué Botsuana es uno de los países africanos con mayor desarrollo y, en cambio, países vecinos como Zimbabue, Congo o Sierra Leona están sumidos en la más desesperante pobreza? ¿Por qué Corea del Norte es uno de los países más pobres del mundo y Corea del Sur uno de los más prósperos? Por qué fracasan los países responde a estas y otras cuestiones con una nueva y convincente teoría: la prosperidad no se debe al clima, a la geografía o a la cultura, sino a las políticas dictaminadas por las instituciones de cada país. Debido a ello, los países no conseguirán que sus economías crezcan hasta que no dispongan de instituciones gubernamentales que desarrollen políticas acertadas. Asimismo, los autores responden a las siguientes cuestiones: • China está creciendo a un ritmo trepidante. ¿Hasta cuándo podrá seguir creciendo al mismo ritmo? ¿Acabará por aplastar al mundo occidental? • ¿Hasta cuándo será Estados Unidos una potencia mundial? ¿Su sistema económico es apto para competir en las próximas décadas? • ¿Cuál es el mejor método para sacar de la pobreza a millones de personas? ¿Realmente las ayudas de Occidente ayudan a erradicar las hambrunas? A través de una cuidada selección de ejemplos históricos y actuales (desde la antigua Roma pasando por los Tudor y llegando a la China moderna) los reconocidos profesores Daron Acemoglu y James A. Robinson harán que usted vea el mundo, y sus problemas, de un modo completamente distinto.

NEW YORK TIMES AND WALL STREET JOURNAL BESTSELLER • From two winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, “who have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for a country’s prosperity” “A wildly ambitious work that hopscotches through history and around the world to answer the very big question of why some countries get rich and others don’t.”—The New York Times FINALIST: Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award • ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR: The Washington Post, Financial Times, The Economist, BusinessWeek, Bloomberg, The Christian Science Monitor, The Plain Dealer Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, or geography that determines prosperity or poverty? As Why Nations Fail shows, none of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Drawing on fifteen years of original research, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is our man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or the lack of it). Korea, to take just one example, is a remarkably homogenous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created those two different institutional trajectories. Acemoglu and Robinson marshal extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, among them: • Will China’s economy continue to grow at such a high speed and ultimately overwhelm the West? • Are America’s best days behind it? Are we creating a vicious cycle that enriches and empowers a small minority? “This book will change the way people think about the wealth and poverty of nations . . . as ambitious as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.”—BusinessWeek

Originally published in single magazine form in JUSTICE LEAGUE OF AMERICA (2006 series) #49-53 and STARMAN/CONGORILLA #1.

Because of their more limited inequality and more comprehensive social welfare systems, many perceive average welfare to be higher in Scandinavian societies than in the United States. Why then does the United States not adopt Scandinavian-style institutions? More generally, in an interdependent world, would we expect all countries to adopt the same institutions? To provide theoretical answers to this question, we develop a simple model of economic growth in a world in which all countries benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. A greater gap of incomes between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs (thus greater inequality) increases entrepreneurial effort and hence a country''s contribution to the world technology frontier. We show that, under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric: some countries will opt for a type of "cutthroat" capitalism that generates greater inequality and more innovation and will become the technology leaders, while others will free-ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more cuddly form of capitalism. Paradoxically, those with cuddly reward structures, though poorer, may have higher welfare than cutthroat capitalists; but in the world equilibrium, it is not a best response for the cutthroat capitalists to switch to a more cuddly form of capitalism. We also show that domestic constraints from social democratic parties or unions may be beneficial for a country because they prevent cutthroat capitalism domestically, instead inducing other countries to play this role. Keywords: cutthroat capitalism, economic growth, inequality, innovation, interdependences, technological change. JEL Classification: O40, O43, O33, P10, P16.

"Originally published in single magazine form in Superman secret files 2009 1, Superman annual 1, Superman 692-697, Adventure comics 11"--Tp verso.

Abstract: David Albouy expresses three main concerns about the results in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) on the relationship between potential settler mortality and institutions. First, there is a general concern that there are high mortality outliers, potentially affecting this relationship, with which we agree. However, limiting the effect of outliers has no impact on our substantive results and if anything significantly strengthens them, in fact making them robust to even extreme versions of his other critiques. His second argument that all the data from Latin America and much of the data from Africa, making up almost 60% of our sample, should be dropped is arbitrary - there is a great deal of well-documented comparable information on the mortality of Europeans in those places during the relevant period. His third argument that a "campaign" dummy should be included in the first stage is at odds with the historical record and is implemented inconsistently; even modest corrections undermine his claims

Though models of political economy suggest that changes in political institutions, such as democratization, should have large effects on policies and economic outcomes, the empirical literature finds ambiguous results. It is important, however, to ''unbundle'' democratic reforms into more specific changes, for instance the introduction of secrecy of balloting, and be more specific about the mechanisms linking these to economic outcomes. To this end we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of the absence of a secret ballot. While providing workers with employment, landlords can also impose some degree of political control. When voting is not secret, landlords can dictate who their workers should vote for. As votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents, vote control increases the demand for labor and for land. The introduction of secret ballot should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron-client relationships and vote control were the strongest. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in Chile around May 31st. 1958, for which we collected original data. A characteristic of rural Chile at this time was the inquilinaje system, by which a worker, the inquilino, entered into a long term, often hereditary, employment relationship with a landlord, and lived on his landlord''s estate. We show that the introduction of the secret ballot in 1958 had implications for land prices which are perfectly consistent with the predictions of our model. Political rents represented 25% of the value of the land in Chile prior to 1958.

Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its'' intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain? Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America? Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a ''curse'' in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth? In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects. We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies.

In this paper we revisit the central finding in Comparative politics that the greater the per-capita income of a country, the more likely it is to be democratic. We argue that the existing empirical literature fails to treat seriously the fact that income and democracy are jointly determined in a political-economic equilibrium. Based on our previous research we argue that whether or not a country is democratic and whether or not it is prosperous depends on its underlying institutions. We first show that once you control for country-specific variation in institutions using fixed effects income per-capita never plays a role in determining democracy. This finding is robust to different estimation techniques, covariates, and sample. We then try to directly control for institutions by using historical data from former European colonies. This restriction is motivated by the fact that we have exogenous sources of institutional variation for this sub-set of countries. We show that when we use these variables to control for the historical creation of institutions (age of country, population density in 1500, and a measure of institutions at the date of independence) they have statistically indistinguishable effects rom the results with fixed effect. The main conclusion is that we find no evidence that income causes democracy. Rather, different countries move onto different development paths as the results of critical junctures and historical circumstances (such as European colonialism). Different paths are supported by different sets of institutions and the nexus of institutions that promotes prosperity simultaneously tends to lead to democracy.