Best Selling Books by Jacob S. Hacker

America''s leaders say the economy is strong and getting stronger. But the safety net that once protected us is fast unraveling. With retirement plans in growing jeopardy while health coverage erodes, more and more economic risk is shifting from government and business onto the fragile shoulders of the American family. In The Great Risk Shift, Jacob S. Hacker lays bare this unsettling new economic climate, showing how it has come about, what it is doing to our families, and how we can fight back. Behind this shift, he contends, is the Personal Responsibility Crusade, eagerly embraced by corporate leaders and Republican politicians who speak of a nirvana of economic empowerment, an "ownership society" in which Americans are free to choose. But as Hacker reveals, the result has been quite different: a harsh new world of economic insecurity, in which far too many Americans are free to lose. The book documents how two great pillars of economic security--the family and the workplace--guarantee far less financial stability than they once did. The final leg of economic support--the public and private benefits that workers and families get when economic disaster strikes--has dangerously eroded as political leaders and corporations increasingly cut back protections of our health care, our income security, and our retirement pensions. Blending powerful human stories, big-picture analysis, and compelling ideas for reform, this remarkable volume will hit a nerve, serving as a rallying point in the vital struggle for economic security in an increasingly uncertain world.

A New York Times Editors’ Choice An “essential” (Jane Mayer) account of the dangerous marriage of plutocratic economic priorities and right-wing populist appeals — and how it threatens the pillars of American democracy. In Let Them Eat Tweets, best-selling political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that despite the rhetoric of Donald Trump, Josh Hawley, and other right-wing “populists,” the Republican Party came to serve its plutocratic masters to a degree without precedent in modern global history. To maintain power while serving the 0.1 percent, the GOP has relied on increasingly incendiary racial and cultural appeals to its almost entirely white base. Calling this dangerous hybrid “plutocratic populism,” Hacker and Pierson show how, over the last forty years, reactionary plutocrats and right-wing populists have become the two faces of a party that now actively undermines democracy to achieve its goals against the will of the majority of Americans. Based on decades of research and featuring a new epilogue about the intensification of GOP radicalism after the 2020 election, Let Them Eat Tweets authoritatively explains the doom loop of tax cutting and fearmongering that defines the Republican Party—and reveals how the rest of us can fight back.

A “provocative” (Kirkus Reviews), timely, and topical work that examines what’s good for American business and what’s good for Americans—and why those interests are misaligned. In American Amnesia, bestselling political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson trace the economic and political history of the United States over the last century and show how a viable mixed economy has long been the dominant engine of America’s prosperity. We have largely forgotten this reliance, as many political circles and corporate actors have come to mistakenly see government as a hindrance rather than the propeller it once was. “American Amnesia” is more than a rhetorical phrase; elites have literally forgotten, or at least forgotten to talk about, the essential role of public authority in achieving big positive-sum bargains in advanced societies. The mixed economy was the most important social innovation of the twentieth century. It spread a previously unimaginable level of broad prosperity. It enabled steep increases in education, health, longevity, and economic security. And yet, extraordinarily, it is anathema to many current economic and political elites. Looking at this record of remarkable accomplishment, they recoil in horror. And as the advocates of anti-government free market fundamentalist have gained power, they are hell-bent on scrapping the instrument of nearly a century of unprecedented economic and social progress. In the American Amnesia, Hacker and Pierson explain the full “story of how government helped make America great, how the enthusiasm for bashing government is behind its current malaise, and how a return to effective government is the answer the nation is looking for” (The New York Times).

For decades, center-left parties in the West have been moving right on economic issues. They have also become less oriented to the working class, growing their support among the affluent and highly educated—what economist Thomas Piketty has dubbed the “Brahmin Left.” Until recently, the U.S. Democratic Party has been no exception—leading to accusations, from both left and right, that it engages in culture wars at the expense of economics. In this issue, political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson say that trend is over: the Democrats have decisively broken with the politics of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. What explains the Democrats’ “U-turn” on economics, despite their growing reliance on affluent suburban voters? Can it work—as both an economic project and a way of building power? And what does this transformation mean for the future of the party—and a nation facing down democratic crisis Hacker and Pierson lead a forum with responses from Jared Abbott, Larry Bartels, Bryce Covert, Ted Fertik & Tim Sahay, Heather Gautney, Lily Geismer, Representative Ro Khanna, and Dorian Warren & Thomas Ogorzalek. Elsewhere in the issue, Barnett R. Rubin examines the relationship between Zionism and colonialism—and what it means (and doesn’t mean) for a political solution in Israel and Palestine. We talk with Palestinian-American poet Fady Joudah and feature two poems he wrote after October 7. Plus essays on Walter Rodney’s radical legacy, geopolitics amid war in Gaza, and more. Full list of contributors: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson lead a forum with Jared Abbott, Larry M. Bartels, Bryce Covert, Ted Fertik & Tim Sahay, Heather Gautney, Lily Geismer, Ro Khanna, and Dorian Warren & Thomas Ogorzalek—plus work by Noaman G. Ali & Shozab Raza, Abena Ampofoa Asare, Rachel Ida Buff, Helena Cobban, Fady Joudah, and Barnett R. Rubin.

Over the past three decades, the contours of American social, economic, and political life have changed dramatically. The post-war patterns of broadly distributed economic growth have given way to stark inequalities of income and wealth, the GOP and its allies have gained power and shifted U.S. politics rightward, and the role of government in the lives of Americans has changed fundamentally. Remaking America explores how these trends are related, investigating the complex interactions of economics, politics, and public policy. Remaking America explains how the broad restructuring of government policy has both reflected and propelled major shifts in the character of inequality and democracy in the United States. The contributors explore how recent political and policy changes affect not just the social standing of Americans but also the character of democratic citizenship in the United States today. Lawrence Jacobs shows how partisan politics, public opinion, and interest groups have shaped the evolution of Medicare, but also how Medicare itself restructured health politics in America. Kimberly Morgan explains how highly visible tax policies created an opportunity for conservatives to lead a grassroots tax revolt that ultimately eroded of the revenues needed for social-welfare programs. Deborah Stone explores how new policies have redefined participation in the labor force—as opposed to fulfilling family or civic obligations—as the central criterion of citizenship. Frances Fox Piven explains how low-income women remain creative and vital political actors in an era in which welfare programs increasingly subject them to stringent behavioral requirements and monitoring. Joshua Guetzkow and Bruce Western document the rise of mass incarceration in America and illuminate its unhealthy effects on state social-policy efforts and the civic status of African-American men. For many disadvantaged Americans who used to look to government as a source of opportunity and security, the state has become increasingly paternalistic and punitive. Far from standing alone, their experience reflects a broader set of political victories and policy revolutions that have fundamentally altered American democracy and society. Empirically grounded and theoretically informed, Remaking America connects the dots to provide insight into the remarkable social and political changes of the last three decades.

A groundbreaking work that identifies the real culprit behind one of the great economic crimes of our time— the growing inequality of incomes between the vast majority of Americans and the richest of the rich. We all know that the very rich have gotten a lot richer these past few decades while most Americans haven’t. In fact, the exorbitantly paid have continued to thrive during the current economic crisis, even as the rest of Americans have continued to fall behind. Why do the “haveit- alls” have so much more? And how have they managed to restructure the economy to reap the lion’s share of the gains and shift the costs of their new economic playground downward, tearing new holes in the safety net and saddling all of us with increased debt and risk? Lots of so-called experts claim to have solved this great mystery, but no one has really gotten to the bottom of it—until now. In their lively and provocative Winner-Take-All Politics, renowned political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson demonstrate convincingly that the usual suspects—foreign trade and financial globalization, technological changes in the workplace, increased education at the top—are largely innocent of the charges against them. Instead, they indict an unlikely suspect and take us on an entertaining tour of the mountain of evidence against the culprit. The guilty party is American politics. Runaway inequality and the present economic crisis reflect what government has done to aid the rich and what it has not done to safeguard the interests of the middle class. The winner-take-all economy is primarily a result of winner-take-all politics. In an innovative historical departure, Hacker and Pierson trace the rise of the winner-take-all economy back to the late 1970s when, under a Democratic president and a Democratic Congress, a major transformation of American politics occurred. With big business and conservative ideologues organizing themselves to undo the regulations and progressive tax policies that had helped ensure a fair distribution of economic rewards, deregulation got under way, taxes were cut for the wealthiest, and business decisively defeated labor in Washington. And this transformation continued under Reagan and the Bushes as well as under Clinton, with both parties catering to the interests of those at the very top. Hacker and Pierson’s gripping narration of the epic battles waged during President Obama’s first two years in office reveals an unpleasant but catalyzing truth: winner-take-all politics, while under challenge, is still very much with us. Winner-Take-All Politics—part revelatory history, part political analysis, part intellectual journey— shows how a political system that traditionally has been responsive to the interests of the middle class has been hijacked by the superrich. In doing so, it not only changes how we think about American politics, but also points the way to rebuilding a democracy that serves the interests of the many rather than just those of the wealthy few.

The Republicans who run American government today have defied the normal laws of political gravity. They have ruled with the slimmest of majorities and yet have transformed the nation’s governing priorities. They have strayed dramatically from the moderate middle of public opinion and yet have faced little public backlash. Again and again, they have sided with the affluent and ideologically extreme while paying little heed to the broad majority of Americans. And much more often than not, they have come out on top. This book shows why—and why this troubling state of affairs can and must be changed. Written in a highly accessible style by two professional political scientists, Off Center tells the story of a deliberative process restricted and distorted by party chieftains, of unresponsive power brokers subverting the popular will, and of legislation written by and for powerful interests and deliberately designed to mute popular discontent. In the best tradition of engaged social science, Off Center is a powerful and informed critique that points the way toward a stronger foundation for American democracy.

The Divided Welfare State is the first comprehensive political analysis of America''s system of public and private social benefits. Everyone knows that the American welfare state is less expensive and extensive, later to develop and slower to grow, than comparable programs abroad. American social spending is as high as spending in many European nations. What is distinctive is that so many social welfare duties are handled by the private sector with government support. With historical reach and statistical and cross-national evidence, The Divided Welfare State demonstrates that private social benefits have not been shaped by public policy, but have deeply influenced the politics of public social programs - to produce a social policy framework whose political and social effects are strikingly different than often assumed. At a time of fierce new debates about social policy, this book is essential to understanding the roots of America''s distinctive model and its future possibilities.

Drawing on records of President Clinton''s 1992 election campaign and interviews with key policy players, this text analyzes political theories on agenda setting. It investigates how managed competition became the President''s reform framework, and shows how issues and

Even before the sharp downturn that began in 2007, many Americans were concerned about economic risks. Yet this widespread public concern has not been matched by attention from political scientists regarding how citizens experience and understand the economic risks they face or how those experiences and understandings shape their views of public policy. We develop here an argument about the role of personal economic experiences in the formation of policy attitudes that we validate using a distinctive opinion survey of our own design, fielded not long after the onset of the Great Recession. The survey tracks citizens'' economic experiences, expectations, and policy attitudes within multiple domains of risk (employment, medical care, family, and wealth arrangements). These investigations show that economic insecurity systematically and substantially affects citizens'' attitudes toward government''s role. Citizens'' economic worries largely track exposure to substantial economic shocks. Citizens'' policy attitudes in turn appear highly responsive to economic worries, as well as to the experience of economic shocks -- with worries and shocks creating greater support for government policies that buffer the relevant economic risk. Attitudes seem most affected by temporally proximate shocks, shocks befalling households that have weak private safety nets, and shocks occurring within the domain most relevant to the policy in question, though attitudes are also (more weakly) correlated with shocks in other domains. The magnitude of these associations rivals partisanship and ideology and almost always exceeds that for conventional measures of socio-economic status. Given the long-term increase in economic insecurity and current sluggish recovery, understanding how insecurity shapes citizens'' policy attitudes and political behavior should be a major concern of political science.

Presidents shape the economy; the economy shapes presidencies. Yet analyses of presidential influence over the economy usually examine this interplay through an excessively narrow focus: the ability of presidents to shape short-term economic outcomes, particularly as these affect their own reelection prospects. Here, drawing on work in comparative political economy, we ask about the capacity of presidents to influence long-term economic developments, particularly the degree to which the economy produces broadly distributed growth. Focusing on the transformation of American tax policy over the last generation, we stress the constraints and opportunities that come from "durable policy coalitions" of partisans, activists, and organized economic interests seeking enduring shifts in governance. We develop this argument in part through a contrast with the influential views of Larry Bartels, who claims that presidents have a powerful immediate impact on economic inequality. We suggest that presidents are generally much more constrained, while attempting to clarify when and how they make a difference.

"The economic risks faced by American families have increased dramatically over the past three decades. For example, while the share of families experiencing a dip in real income over any two-year period has remained steady at about half, the median income drop for such families has risen from approximately 25 percent of income in the early 1970s to around 40 percent by the late 1990s and early 2000s. Meanwhile, the volatility of family incomes - how much they fluctuate over time - has increased substantially. Several possible policy options need to be debated in response to this increase in economic insecurity. This paper puts forward one potential approach, focused on providing temporary and partial relief from severe economic shocks. This proposed program, Universal Insurance, would be available to the majority of American families and would build on, rather than supplant, existing social insurance programs. It would provide short-term, stop-loss protection to qualifying families whose income suddently declined by 20 percent or more, or whose out-of-pocket health costs in one year amounted to 20 percent or more of their combined income for that year. Although most families would be eligible, the program would be most generous for lower-income families, which have the fewest resources with which to weather economic shocks. This type of broad-based, stop-loss insurance -- covering a range of risks but focused on particulary dramatic cases to minimize incentive problems and target those most in need--could provide a flexible new platform for enhancing economic security in a world of rapidly changing risks. As the nation strugles with rising income insecurity, this proposal, along with other potential policy responses, should be actively debated"--Abstract, page 2.

With vivid facts and clear discussions of economic history, Hacker and Loewentheil show that the only way to achieve sustainable, long-term growth is to build an economy in which the benefits of growth are broadly shared. Their approach contrasts sharply with what they call "austerity economics," the failed economic policy currently championed by right-wing leaders. Prosperity economics presents a bold alternative to the status quo that will rebuild a strong, secure middle class and grow our economy now and for future generations.

Popular support for the welfare state varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue that these variations -- vital to understanding the politics of the welfare state -- reflect in part the degree to which economic disadvantage (low income) and economic insecurity (high risk) are correlated. When the disadvantaged and insecure are mostly one and the same, the base of popular support for the welfare state is narrow. When the disadvantaged and insecure represent two distinct groups, popular support is broader and opinion less polarized. We test these predictions both across nations within a single policy area (unemployment insurance) and across policy domains within a single polity (the United States, using a new survey). Results are consistent with our predictions and are robust to myriad controls and specifications. When disadvantage and insecurity are more correlated, the welfare state is more contested.

The recent economic downturn has cast in stark relief the uncertainties associated with retirement and health care for older Americans. Yet, before the downturn even began, the economic landscape was already shifting in ways that concentrated more risk and responsibility on Americans planning for retirement and health care in old age. In this article, Professor Hacker addresses the current risks faced by aging Americans, moving from the historical retirement framework of the "three legged stool" -- Social Security, private pensions, and personal savings -- to the current reality where pensions are few and far between. In doing so, he pays particular attention to special issues faced by working- and middle-class Americans. Additionally, drawing upon his knowledge of the health care system, Professor Hacker delves into the increasingly important role health care costs play in retirement planning, and how retirement planning should take into account potential future health care costs. Finally, he suggests a series of changes to restore retirement security by alleviating the problems produced by the disappeareance of private pension plans and increases in health care costs.

This article presents the Economic Security Index (ESI), a new measure of economic insecurity. The ESI assesses the individual-level occurrence of substantial year-to-year declines in available household resources, accounting for fluctuations not only in income but also in out-of-pocket medical expenses. It also assesses whether those experiencing such declines have sufficient liquid financial wealth to buffer against these shocks. We find that insecurity - the share of individuals experiencing substantial resource declines without adequate financial buffers - has risen steadily since the mid-1980s for virtually all subgroups of Americans, albeit with cyclical fluctuation. At the same time, we find that there is substantial disparity in the degree to which different subgroups are exposed to economic risk. As the ESI derives from a data-independent conceptual foundation, it can be measured using different panel datasets. We find that the degree and disparity by which insecurity has risen is robust across the best available sources.

The premise of this article is that the category "managed care", like many concepts now prominent in commentary about medical care, poses a barrier to credible analysis. A confused assemblage of market sloganeering, aspirational rhetoric, and business school jargon, the term "managed care" presupposes answers to central questions about contemporary health insurance and its evolution rather than helping to address those questions. The article first discusses the context in which managed care claims have arisen and outlines the diverse trends to which the category is regularly applied. We then suggest an alternative approach to characterizing these trends that breaks them down into their constituent elements -- managerial, financial, and organizational. Our core argument is that health policy research requires more neutral categories for making sense of past and projected developments in methods of reimbursement, techniques of management, organizational forms, and the distribution of risk.

According to a recent survey, a majority of U.S. physicians support health care reform that includes a new national public health insurance plan, which would compete with private plans. Polls have shown that a substantial majority of Americans support the public option as well.

The debate over health care reform has increasingly centered on the issue of “public-plan choice” -- whether Americans younger than 65 who lack employment-based coverage should have the choice of enrolling in a new public health insurance plan that competes with regulated private plans. The idea -- largely ignored in 2008 when it was endorsed by then-presidential-candidate Barack Obama -- has come to dominate an increasingly polarized national debate.