New Releases by Jacob S Hacker

For decades, center-left parties in the West have been moving right on economic issues. They have also become less oriented to the working class, growing their support among the affluent and highly educated—what economist Thomas Piketty has dubbed the “Brahmin Left.” Until recently, the U.S. Democratic Party has been no exception—leading to accusations, from both left and right, that it engages in culture wars at the expense of economics. In this issue, political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson say that trend is over: the Democrats have decisively broken with the politics of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. What explains the Democrats’ “U-turn” on economics, despite their growing reliance on affluent suburban voters? Can it work—as both an economic project and a way of building power? And what does this transformation mean for the future of the party—and a nation facing down democratic crisis Hacker and Pierson lead a forum with responses from Jared Abbott, Larry Bartels, Bryce Covert, Ted Fertik & Tim Sahay, Heather Gautney, Lily Geismer, Representative Ro Khanna, and Dorian Warren & Thomas Ogorzalek. Elsewhere in the issue, Barnett R. Rubin examines the relationship between Zionism and colonialism—and what it means (and doesn’t mean) for a political solution in Israel and Palestine. We talk with Palestinian-American poet Fady Joudah and feature two poems he wrote after October 7. Plus essays on Walter Rodney’s radical legacy, geopolitics amid war in Gaza, and more. Full list of contributors: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson lead a forum with Jared Abbott, Larry M. Bartels, Bryce Covert, Ted Fertik & Tim Sahay, Heather Gautney, Lily Geismer, Ro Khanna, and Dorian Warren & Thomas Ogorzalek—plus work by Noaman G. Ali & Shozab Raza, Abena Ampofoa Asare, Rachel Ida Buff, Helena Cobban, Fady Joudah, and Barnett R. Rubin.

A groundbreaking account of the dangerous marriage of plutocratic economic priorities and right-wing populist appeals—and how it threatens the pillars of American democracy. The Republican Party appears to be divided between a tax-cutting old guard and a white-nationalist vanguard—and with Donald Trump’s ascendance, the upstarts seem to be winning. Yet how are we to explain that, under Trump, the plutocrats have gotten almost everything they want, including a huge tax cut for corporations and the wealthy, regulation-killing executive actions, and a legion of business-friendly federal judges? Does the GOP represent “forgotten” Americans? Or does it represent the superrich? In Let Them Eat Tweets, best-selling political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson offer a definitive answer: the Republican Party serves its plutocratic masters to a degree without precedent in modern global history. Conservative parties, by their nature, almost always side with the rich. But when faced with popular resistance, they usually make concessions, allowing some policies that benefit the working and middle classes. After all, how can a political party maintain power in a democracy if it serves only the interests of a narrow and wealthy slice of society? Today’s Republicans have shown the way, doubling down on a truly radical, elite-benefiting economic agenda while at the same time making increasingly incendiary racial and cultural appeals to their almost entirely white base. Telling a forty-year story, Hacker and Pierson demonstrate that since the early 1980s, when inequality started spiking, extreme tax cutting, union busting, and deregulation have gone hand in hand with extreme race-baiting, outrage stoking, and disinformation. Instead of responding to the real challenges facing voters, the Republican Party offers division and distraction—most prominently, in the racist, nativist bile of the president’s Twitter feed. As Hacker and Pierson argue, Trump isn’t a break with the GOP’s recent past. On the contrary, he embodies its tightening embrace of plutocracy and right-wing extremism—a dynamic Hacker and Pierson call “plutocratic populism.” As Trump and his far-right allies spew hatred and lies, Republicans in Congress and in statehouses attack social programs and funnel more and more money to the top 0.1 percent of Americans. Far from being at war with each other, reactionary plutocrats and right-wing populists have become the two faces of a party that now actively undermines democracy to achieve its goals against the will of the majority of Americans. Drawing on decades of research, Hacker and Pierson authoritatively explain the doom loop of tax cutting and fearmongering that characterizes our era—and reveal how we can fight back.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, health care reform became a hot issue, paving the way for one of the most important yet ill-fated social policy initiatives in American history: Bill Clinton's 1993 proposal for comprehensive coverage under "managed competition." Here Jacob Hacker not only investigates for the first time how managed competition became the president's reform framework, but also illuminates how issues and policies emerge. He follows Clinton's policy ideas from their initial formulation by policy experts through their endorsement by medical industry leaders and politicians to their inclusion--in a new and unexpected form--in the proposal itself. Throughout he explores key questions: Why did health reform become a national issue in the 1990s? Why did Clinton choose managed competition over more familiar options during the 1992 presidential campaign? What effect did this have on the fate of his proposal? Drawing on records of the President's task force, interviews with a wide range of key policy players, and many other sources, Hacker locates his analysis within the context of current political theories on agenda setting. He concludes that Clinton chose managed competition partly because advocates inside and outside the campaign convinced him that it represented a unique middle road to health care reform. This conviction, Hacker maintains, blinded the president and his allies to the political risks of the approach and hindered the development of an effective strategy for enacting it.

On the eve of the financial crisis, Jacob S. Hacker wrote "the policy book of the year" (E.J. Dionne, Jr., Washington Post), demonstrating and explaining the hidden story of growing economic insecurity. In this fully revised and updated second edition, he brings his powerful exposé of "The Great Risk Shift" up to date with startling new evidence and compelling new ideas. Hacker shows that the safety net was unraveling long before the late-2000s, as more and more economic risk shifted from the broad shoulders of government and business onto the fragile backs of American families. Whether the problem is risky jobs brought on by corporate restructuring and the "gig economy" of contingent work, risky families created by the rising costs and instabilities of parenthood, risky retirement caused by the collapse of traditional guaranteed pensions, or risky health care fueled by skyrocketing costs and unstable coverage-Hacker shows what has changed and why, the ways in which ordinary Americans have been affected, and how we can fight back. Behind the risk shift, he contends, is the "Personal Responsibility Crusade" eagerly embraced by corporate leaders and conservative politicians who speak of an economic nirvana in which Americans are free to choose. But the result, Hacker reveals, has been very different: a harsh new world of economic insecurity in which far too many Americans are allowed to fall behind. Blending powerful human stories, big-picture analysis, and compelling ideas for reform, this remarkable volume has become a rallying point in the struggle for economic security in an increasingly uncertain world.

Even before the sharp downturn that began in 2007, many Americans were concerned about economic risks. Yet this widespread public concern has not been matched by attention from political scientists regarding how citizens experience and understand the economic risks they face or how those experiences and understandings shape their views of public policy. We develop here an argument about the role of personal economic experiences in the formation of policy attitudes that we validate using a distinctive opinion survey of our own design, fielded not long after the onset of the Great Recession. The survey tracks citizens' economic experiences, expectations, and policy attitudes within multiple domains of risk (employment, medical care, family, and wealth arrangements). These investigations show that economic insecurity systematically and substantially affects citizens' attitudes toward government's role. Citizens' economic worries largely track exposure to substantial economic shocks. Citizens' policy attitudes in turn appear highly responsive to economic worries, as well as to the experience of economic shocks -- with worries and shocks creating greater support for government policies that buffer the relevant economic risk. Attitudes seem most affected by temporally proximate shocks, shocks befalling households that have weak private safety nets, and shocks occurring within the domain most relevant to the policy in question, though attitudes are also (more weakly) correlated with shocks in other domains. The magnitude of these associations rivals partisanship and ideology and almost always exceeds that for conventional measures of socio-economic status. Given the long-term increase in economic insecurity and current sluggish recovery, understanding how insecurity shapes citizens' policy attitudes and political behavior should be a major concern of political science.

With vivid facts and clear discussions of economic history, Hacker and Loewentheil show that the only way to achieve sustainable, long-term growth is to build an economy in which the benefits of growth are broadly shared. Their approach contrasts sharply with what they call "austerity economics," the failed economic policy currently championed by right-wing leaders. Prosperity economics presents a bold alternative to the status quo that will rebuild a strong, secure middle class and grow our economy now and for future generations.

The recent economic downturn has cast in stark relief the uncertainties associated with retirement and health care for older Americans. Yet, before the downturn even began, the economic landscape was already shifting in ways that concentrated more risk and responsibility on Americans planning for retirement and health care in old age. In this article, Professor Hacker addresses the current risks faced by aging Americans, moving from the historical retirement framework of the "three legged stool" -- Social Security, private pensions, and personal savings -- to the current reality where pensions are few and far between. In doing so, he pays particular attention to special issues faced by working- and middle-class Americans. Additionally, drawing upon his knowledge of the health care system, Professor Hacker delves into the increasingly important role health care costs play in retirement planning, and how retirement planning should take into account potential future health care costs. Finally, he suggests a series of changes to restore retirement security by alleviating the problems produced by the disappeareance of private pension plans and increases in health care costs.

According to a recent survey, a majority of U.S. physicians support health care reform that includes a new national public health insurance plan, which would compete with private plans. Polls have shown that a substantial majority of Americans support the public option as well.

The debate over health care reform has increasingly centered on the issue of “public-plan choice” -- whether Americans younger than 65 who lack employment-based coverage should have the choice of enrolling in a new public health insurance plan that competes with regulated private plans. The idea -- largely ignored in 2008 when it was endorsed by then-presidential-candidate Barack Obama -- has come to dominate an increasingly polarized national debate.

"The economic risks faced by American families have increased dramatically over the past three decades. For example, while the share of families experiencing a dip in real income over any two-year period has remained steady at about half, the median income drop for such families has risen from approximately 25 percent of income in the early 1970s to around 40 percent by the late 1990s and early 2000s. Meanwhile, the volatility of family incomes - how much they fluctuate over time - has increased substantially. Several possible policy options need to be debated in response to this increase in economic insecurity. This paper puts forward one potential approach, focused on providing temporary and partial relief from severe economic shocks. This proposed program, Universal Insurance, would be available to the majority of American families and would build on, rather than supplant, existing social insurance programs. It would provide short-term, stop-loss protection to qualifying families whose income suddently declined by 20 percent or more, or whose out-of-pocket health costs in one year amounted to 20 percent or more of their combined income for that year. Although most families would be eligible, the program would be most generous for lower-income families, which have the fewest resources with which to weather economic shocks. This type of broad-based, stop-loss insurance -- covering a range of risks but focused on particulary dramatic cases to minimize incentive problems and target those most in need--could provide a flexible new platform for enhancing economic security in a world of rapidly changing risks. As the nation strugles with rising income insecurity, this proposal, along with other potential policy responses, should be actively debated"--Abstract, page 2.

The Divided Welfare State is the first comprehensive political analysis of America's system of public and private social benefits. Everyone knows that the American welfare state is less expensive and extensive, later to develop and slower to grow, than comparable programs abroad. American social spending is as high as spending in many European nations. What is distinctive is that so many social welfare duties are handled by the private sector with government support. With historical reach and statistical and cross-national evidence, The Divided Welfare State demonstrates that private social benefits have not been shaped by public policy, but have deeply influenced the politics of public social programs - to produce a social policy framework whose political and social effects are strikingly different than often assumed. At a time of fierce new debates about social policy, this book is essential to understanding the roots of America's distinctive model and its future possibilities.