Best Selling Books by Bob Deen

To help policymakers prepare for what might lie ahead, this report draws up a model consisting of 35 variables that will together shape Russia’s future – based on an extensive literature review and scenario workshop with Dutch and international experts. It then builds on this model to construct a scenario framework for the next five years. These scenarios take into account (1) to what extent the Russian regime could change or persist, (2) to what extent this would be accompanied by large-scale instability and violence, and (3) to what extent a future Russian government would pursue confrontation or rapprochement with the West. The report then puts forward six scenarios based on these variables and presuppositions.

The European Union (EU) is developing a Strategic compass for security and defence, to be ready by March 2022. The first semester of 2021 is the phase of the ‘strategic dialogue’ with the member states and institutions of the EU, including the involvement of think tanks and other stakeholders. Commissioned by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the Clingendael Institute delivers its contribution to the strategic dialogue on the Strategic Compass by focussing on defining more precisely the military level of ambition of the EU and what it implies for capability development and the relationship with NATO. The EU faces a wider set of challenges and threats than ever before. In the global power rivalry between China, Russia and the United States, it is ‘Europe’ that runs the danger of becoming irrelevant and the object of great power actions rather than being a global actor. The arc of instability around Europe is unlikely to turn into an arc of stability. The challenges posed by state and non-state actors – the latter in particular in the southern neighbourhood – require the EU to respond to external conflicts and crises, to support partners to provide security for their own population and to protect the Union and its citizens – the three strategic priorities for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as defined five years ago in the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. While the EU has made progress in many areas – trade policies, partnerships, civilian crisis management – its military tools have remained weak as a result of a lack of political will and the absence of adequate military means.

European strategic autonomy in security and defence is the ability of Europe to make its own decisions, and to have the necessary means, capacity and capabilities available to act upon these decisions, in such a manner that it is able to properly function on its own when needed. From this definition it follows that four interrelated aspects have to be taken into account: the political, institutional, capabilities and technological-industrial dimensions.

This report assesses three policy dilemmas that need to be considered by the Netherlands and the European Union in order to make the EaP more effective. First, the EU needs to reconcile its geopolitical interests with its normative aspirations. Second, the added value of the EaP’s multilateral track should be deliberated with consideration of the differentiation in bilateral relations with EaP countries. Third, the EU will need to consider how to deal with protracted conflicts, hybrid threats, and other security challenges in the EaP region.

This report concludes that there are at least three situations in which the EU’s mutual assistance clause could plausibly be invoked: in response to a terrorist attack, against hybrid forms of aggression such as serious cyberattacks, and as a result of a kinetic military attack. There are also EU member states that are not members of NATO and that might want to rely on Article 42(7) as a means of last resort. Some calamitous situations may even be conceivable in which one NATO ally could invoke it against another. As uncomfortable and hypothetical as these scenarios may be, the EU should nonetheless be prepared to respond in case they do materialise. Regular exercises and the drafting of a non-binding document outlining the EU’s response options would be a step in the right direction.

Inmiddels woedt alweer een jaar oorlog in het oosten van Europa. Het grove geweld, de vele slachtoffers, de vernietigde steden, het zijn beelden van een grote tragedie. Zolang als de oorlog duurt is de vraag: wat kunnen westerse landen doen om Oekraïne te helpen zich teweer te stellen tegen de Russische agressie en haar bezette grondgebied te bevrijden? Moeten we naast tanks en munitie ook F16s en raketartillerie met nog langere dracht leveren, waar Oekraïne om heeft gevraagd? Of moeten we voorzichtig zijn om zo het escalatierisico te beperken? Hoeveel gaat deze oorlog nog kosten, zowel in geld als in mensenlevens? Het zijn terechte vragen.

De nieuwe Barometer Alert laat een sterk verhoogde perceptie zien van de Russische bedreiging van onze veiligheid. In september 2020 was de Nederlandse bevolking nog verdeeld over de vraag of Rusland een bedreiging is voor de veiligheid van Europa. Ruim 35% zag Rusland als bedreiging, 38% was neutraal, en 27% zag Rusland niet als bedreiging. Het dreigingsbeeld bleek gepolariseerd: mensen met uiteenlopende politieke voorkeuren dachten verschillend over de internationale dreiging die van Rusland uitgaat. In oktober 2022 blijkt de dreigingsperceptie fors toegenomen. Er is in deze peiling gevraagd of Rusland een bedreiging is voor de veiligheid van Nederland: 71% is het hiermee eens, 14% oneens en 15% is neutraal. ''Aan de ene kant zijn de Nederlanders minder enthousiast over het Russische nationalisme en voor zover ze nog wel enthousiast zijn over het conservatisme in Rusland is dat geen beletsel om te vinden dat Rusland wel een dreiging kan zijn,'' zegt onderzoeker en Clingendael-directeur Monika Sie.