Best Selling Books by Thomas Piketty

Né en 1971, Thomas Piketty est ancien élève de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, docteur de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales et chercheur en économie au CNRS. Ancien professeur au département d'Economie du Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), il est également membre du Conseil d'Analyse Economique du Premier Ministre. Le Livre : La question des inégalités est au coeur de la vie politique française. On a dit et écrit tout et son contraire sur ce sujet. La somme proposée ici sera, sans conteste, l'ouvrage de référence sur la question. Ce livre dresse le tableau d'un siècle d'inégalités. Il montre que, contrairement à une idée reçue, l'inégalité des salaires et restée sensiblement la même en France tout au long du XXème siècle : le pouvoir d'achat a été multiplié par 5, mais la hiérarchie n'a pratiquement pas changé. L'inégalité totale des revenus a fortement diminué au cours des années 1914-1945, mais cette baisse est due pour l'essentiel aux chocs subis par les revenus du capital (destructions, inflation, crise des années 1930), et non pas à un processus économique « naturel ». La concentration des fortunes et des revenus du capital n'a par la suite jamais retrouvé le niveau astronomique qui était le sien à la veille de la première guerre mondiale, ce qui semble s'expliquer par l'impact de l'impôt progressif sur l'accumulation et la reconstitution de patrimoines importants. En l'absence de ces chocs et de l'impôt progressif, il est probable que la France n'aurait pas quitté de sitôt le sommet inégalitaire du début du siècle. Thomas Piketty, qui se fonde notamment sur une exploitation systématique de sources fiscales permettant de couvrir l'ensemble du siècle (déclarations de revenus, de salaires et de successions), analyse également comment les perceptions de ces inégalités ont évolué de 1901 à 1998 (« fin des rentiers », « montée des cadres », etc..). La question des inégalités apparaît alors comme une véritable grille de lecture de l'histoire générale de la France au XXème siècle.

A desigualdade é consequência da concentração do capital? É transmitida de geração a geração ou deriva das diferenças salariais, que por sua vez resultariam do jogo de oferta e demanda do mercado de trabalho? É possível reduzir a desigualdade de oportunidades com investimento em educação? O sistema tributário moderno é capaz de promover a redistribuição de renda ou é preciso uma grande reforma? A economia da desigualdade demonstra que o antagonismo esquerda/direita do debate político não discorda necessariamente em suas noções de justiça social, mas sim nos mecanismos econômicos que produzem a desigualdade e em como minorá-la. Em edição atualizada, incluindo gráficos e tabelas, o livro é mais uma valiosa aula de Piketty sobre a natureza da distribuição de renda e o cenário econômico mundial. “Piketty transformou nosso discurso econômico; jamais voltaremos a falar sobre renda e desigualdade da mesma maneira.” Paul Krugman (Prêmio Nobel de Economia), The New York Times “Como corrigir a desigualdade? O livro de Thomas Piketty chega na hora certa para enriquecer o debate.” Le Monde “Piketty escreve com a elegância com que a atriz Gwyneth Paltrow se veste. O capital no século XXI é um monumento de pesquisa e elegância.” Elio Gaspari, Folha de S.Paulo e O Globo “Concordo com as principais conclusões de Piketty. Espero que seu trabalho estimule mais pessoas competentes a estudar a desigualdade de riqueza e de renda. Quanto mais entendermos das causas e curas, melhor.” Bill Gates, The Gates Notes Best-seller da Veja

This paper develops a realistic, tractable normative theory of socially-optimal capital taxation. We present a dynamic model of savings and bequests with heterogeneous random tastes for bequests to children and for wealth per se. We derive formulas for optimal tax rates on capitalized inheritance expressed in terms of estimable parameters and social preferences. The long-run optimal tax rate increases with the aggregate steady-state flow of inheritances to output, decreases with the elasticity of bequests to the net-of-tax rate, and decreases with the strength of preferences for leaving bequests. For realistic parameters, the optimal tax rate on capitalized inheritance should be as high as 50%-60% - or even higher for top wealth holders - if the government has meritocratic preferences (i.e., puts higher welfare weights on those receiving little inheritance) and if capital is highly concentrated (as it is in the real world). In contrast to the Atkinson-Stiglitz result, bequest taxation remains desirable in our model even with optimal labor taxation because inequality is two-dimensional: with inheritances, labor income is no longer the unique determinant of lifetime resources. In contrast to Chamley-Judd, positive capital taxation is desirable because our preferences allow for finite long run elasticities of inheritance to tax rates. Finally, we discuss how capital market imperfections and uninsurable shocks to rates of return can justify shifting one-off inheritance taxation toward lifetime capital taxation, and can account for the actual structure and mix of inheritance and capital taxation.

This paper combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pre-tax and post-tax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pre-tax national income per adult has increased 60% since 1980, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50% of the distribution at about $16,000 a year. The pre-tax income of the middle class -- adults between the median and the 90th percentile -- has grown 40% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top: in 1980, top 1% adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50% adults, while they earn 81 times more today. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults. The share of women, however, falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11% in the top 0.1% today.

Onderzoek naar de mate van inkomensongelijkheid in verschillende landen en werelddelen en de ontwikkeling daarvan in de afgelopen jaren.

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal taxation of top labour incomes. We develop a model where top incomes respond to marginal tax rates through three channels: (1) the standard supply-side channel through reduced economic activity, (2) the tax avoidance channel, (3) the compensation bargaining channel through efforts in influencing own pay setting. We derive the optimal top tax rate formula as a function of the three elasticities corresponding to those three channels of responses. The first elasticity (supply side) is the sole real factor limiting optimal top tax rates. The optimal tax system should be designed to minimize the second elasticity (avoidance) through tax enforcement and tax neutrality across income forms, in which case the second elasticity becomes irrelevant. The optimal top tax rate increases with the third elasticity (bargaining) as bargaining efforts are zero-sum in aggregate. We then analyze top income and top tax rate data in 18 OECD countries. There is a strong correlation between cuts in top tax rates and increases in top 1% income shares since 1975, implying that the overall elasticity is large. But top income share increases have not translated into higher economic growth, consistent with the zero-sum bargaining model. This suggests that the first elasticity is modest in size and that the overall effect comes mostly from the third elasticity. Consequently, socially optimal top tax rates might possibly be much higher than what is commonly assumed.

We consider an infinite-horizon inter-generational economy with identical agents differing only in their inherited wealth and with a constant-returns-to-scale technology using capital and labour (called quot;effortquot;) and displaying a purely idiosyncratic risk. If effort is contractible, full insurance contracts make the production deterministic and initial wealth inequalities cannot persist (just as in a neoclassical growth model). But if effort is not contractible the ability to commit is an increasing function of initial wealth so that in equilibrium poorer agents face tougher credit rationing and take smaller projects (i.e. use less capital); although there is no poverty trap, the initial distribution may have long-run effects: there can be multiple long-run stationary distributions, and all are continuous and ergodic on the same interval, but have different equilibrium interest rates (and therefore different degrees of intergenerational mobility). This provides an explanation for wealth differentials within a country as well as between countries, and a basis for redistributive policies with long-run effects.

This paper reviews recent developments in the theory of optimal labor income taxation. We emphasize connections between theory and empirical work that were initially lacking from optimal income tax theory. First, we provide historical and international background on labor income taxation and means-tested transfers. Second, we present the simple model of optimal linear taxation. Third, we consider optimal nonlinear income taxation with particular emphasis on the optimal top tax rate and the optimal profile of means-tested transfers. Fourth, we consider various extensions of the standard model including tax avoidance and income shifting, international migration, models with rent-seeking, relative income concerns, the treatment of couples and children, and non-cash transfers. Finally, we discuss limitations of the standard utilitarian approach and briefly review alternatives. In all cases, we use the simplest possible models and show how optimal tax formulas can be derived and expressed in terms of sufficient statistics that include social marginal welfare weights capturing society's value for redistribution, behavioral elasticities capturing the efficiency costs of taxation, as well as parameters of the earnings distribution. We also emphasize connections between actual practice and the predictions from theory, and in particular the limitations of both theory and empirical work in settling the political debate on optimal labor income taxation and transfers.

We combine household surveys and national accounts, as well as recently released tax data in a systematic way to track the dynamics of Indian income inequality from 1922 to 2014. According to our benchmark estimates, the share of national income accruing to the top 1% income earners is now at its highest level since the creation of the Indian Income tax in 1922. The top 1% of earners captured less than 21% of total income in the late 1930s, before dropping to 6% in the early 1980s and rising to 22% today. Over the 1951-1980 period, the bottom 50% group captured 28% of total growth and incomes of this group grew faster than the average, while the top 0.1% incomes decreased. Over the 1980-2014 period, the situation was reversed; the top 0.1% of earners captured a higher share of total growth than the bottom 50% (12% vs. 11%), while the top 1% received a higher share of total growth than the middle 40% (29% vs. 23%). These findings suggest that much can be done to promote more inclusive growth in India. Our results also appear to be robust to a range of alternative assumptions seeking to address data limitations. Most importantly, we stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth statistics to avoid another "black decade" similar to the 2000s, during which India entered the digital age but stopped publishing tax statistics. Such data sources are key to track the long run evolution of inequality and to allow an informed democratic debate on inequality.

We define generalized Pareto curves as the curve of inverted Pareto coefficients b(p), where b(p) is the ratio between average income or wealth above rank p and the p-th quantile Q(p) (i.e. b(p) = E[X|X > Q(p)]/Q(p)). We use them to characterize entire distributions, including places like the top where power laws are a good description, and places further down where they are not. We develop a method to nonparametrically recover the entire distribution based on tabulated income or wealth data as is generally available from tax authorities, which produces smooth and realistic shapes of generalized Pareto curves. Using detailed tabulations from quasi-exhaustive tax data, we demonstrate the precision of our method both empirically and analytically. It gives better results than the most commonly used interpolation techniques. Finally, we use Pareto curves to identify recurring distributional patterns, and connect those findings to the existing literature that explains observed distributions by random growth models.

This paper presents data on the evolution of top incomes and wages from 1956 to 2000 in India using individual tax returns data. Our data shows that the shares of the top 0.01%, the top 0.1% and the top 1% in total income, shrank very substantially until the early to mid 1980s but then went back up again, so that today these shares are only slightly below what they were in 1956. We argue that this U-shaped pattern is broadly consistent with the evolution of economic policy in India: The period from 1956 to the early to mid 1980s was also the period of "socialist" policies in India, while the subsequent period, starting with the rise of Rajiv Gandhi, saw a gradual shift towards more pro-business policies. Although the initial share of this group was small, the fact that the rich were getting richer had a non-trivial impact on the overall income distribution. In particular, its impact is not large enough to fully explain the gap between average consumption growth in survey-based NSS data and the National accounts based NAS data, but is sufficiently large to explain a non-negligible part of it (between 20% and 40%). Keywords: Top Incomes, Inequality, Liberalization. JEL Classification: D31, O15, O53.

Bulletin critique du livre français. " Cet ouvrage est remarquable par son information. Il fait bénéficier des recherches, principalement anglo-saxonnes, les plus récentes, et il les synthétise avec une grande maîtrise. " Le Monde. " Comment corriger les inégalités ? Le livre de Thomas Piketty arrive à point pour éclairer le débat. " L'Expansion. " Une remise en perspective réalisée par l'économiste qui monte. " La Tribune. " Ce tout jeune économiste fait déjà autorité sur le sujet. " Cadres CFDT. " Tout est expliqué ici avec rigueur et nuances. À lire absolument. " Projet. " Voici une bonne approche analytique des effets de la répartition des revenus sur l'allocation des ressources et sur l'efficacité à long terme. "

Hvilke store krefter driver akkumulasjon og fordeling av kapital? Hvordan oppstår ulikheter over tid? Hvorfor hoper velstand seg opp? Slike spørsmål er sentrale i politisk økonomi, men mangel på adekvat forskning og klare teorier har gjort det vanskelig å finne tilfredsstillende svar. I denne boken analyserer Thomas Piketty en enestående samling data fra 20 ulike land, datert så langt tilbake som 1700-tallet, for å synliggjøre sentrale økonomiske og sosiale utviklingsmønstre. I følge forlaget er «Kapitalen i det 21. århundre» et usedvanlig ambisiøst, originalt og hardtslående verk som redefinerer vår forståelse av verdens økonomiske historie og gir oss nyttig innsikt i dagens situasjon.

On capital in the 21st century.