New Releases by Robert J. Gordon

Starting from the same level of productivity and per-capita income as the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, Europe fell behind steadily to a level of barely half in 1950, and then began a rapid catch-up. While Europe''s level of productivity has almost converged, its income per person has leveled off at about three-quarters of America''s. How could Europe be so productive yet so poor? The simple answer is that hours per person in Europe have fallen drastically in the past 40 years, reflecting long vacations, high unemployment, and low labor force participation, and only about one-third of the Europe-America difference reflects voluntarily chosen leisure. The paper contains a welfare analysis of the difference and argues that conventional national income data overstate the advantage of America over Europe, and that Europe''s welfare is about 8 percent below the American level rather than the 25 percent implied by a comparison of measured income per capita. A historical analysis traces Europe''s falling behind after 1870 to American political unity, fostering large-scale material-intensive manufacturing and a set of marketing innovations to a set of additional advantages that would not have been possessed even if Europe had hypothetically created a United States of Europe in 1870. After 1913 the U.S. surged further ahead, due to its early exploitation of the great inventions of electricity and the internal combustion engine, while Europe was distracted by wars and interwar economic chaos. After 1950 Europe''s catch up was achieved both by exploiting the great inventions 40 years late, and also by the gradual erosion of early American advantages. But after 1995 the gap began to widen again, a development that brings to the forefront fundamental American advantages in fostering and exploiting innovation.

By far the most widely noted and puzzling aspect of the current economic recovery is its failure to create jobs. While payroll employment in seven previous recessions increased a full 7 percent in the first twenty-three months following the NBER business cycle trough, such employment increased by only 0.8 percent - just over one-tenth as much - from March 1991 to March 1993. Part of the explanation of negligible job growth lies in the recovery''s relatively slow pace of output growth, which has been little more than one-third the usual postwar pace. The remaining part of the job puzzle stems from the ebullient performance of productivity - that is, output per hour in the nonfarm business sector - which registered a growth rate of 3.2 percent in the four quarters ending in 1992:4, the most rapid rate recorded in any similar period for more than sixteen years. The share of output growth accounted for by productivity growth in the current recovery is 112 percent, far exceeding the 47 percent average of the previous postwar recoveries at the same stage. For any given pace of output growth, more rapid productivity growth by definition implies less rapid growth in labor input. This suggests that the recent revival in productivity growth may be the key to understanding the puzzling absence of job creation in the recovery. Productivity-led growth is nothing but good news. In the two decades ending in mid-1992, the nonfarm business sector registered an average annual productivity growth rate of less than 1 percent: 0.85 percent, to be exact. Imagine the benefits to the economy if the recent good news on productivity were to imply, as some have suggested, a doubling in productivity growth to a rate of 1.7 percent over the next decade. For any given path of labor input, nonfarm private business output in the year 2003 would be almost 9 percent larger - some $450 billion more - allowing that much more private and/or public spending. Productivity-led growth does not imply a jobless recovery in anything but the shortest run. Instead, any beneficial shock to productivity growth sets the stage for lower inflation that enables policy makers to stimulate output growth sufficiently to create the same number of jobs that would have occurred in the absence of the shock. If the jobless character of the 1991-93 recovery indeed has been caused by a benign productivity shock, then its jobless character implies that there has been too little stimulus to output growth, not that a productivity surge must necessarily rob the nation of jobs.

After fifty years of catching up to the United States level of productivity, since 1995 Europe has been falling behind. The growth rate in output per hour over 1995-2003 in Europe was just half that in the United States, and this annual growth shortfall caused the level of European productivity to fall back from 94 percent of the United States level to 85 percent. Fully one-fifth of the European catch-up (from 44 to 94 percent) over the previous half-century has been lost over the period since 1995. Disaggregated studies of industrial sectors suggest that the main difference between Europe and the United States is in ICT-using industries like wholesale and retail trade and in securities trading. The contrast in retailing calls attention to regulatory barriers and land-use regulations in Europe that inhibit the development of the big box retailing formats that have created many of the productivity gains in the United States. For many decades, the United States and Europe have gone in opposite directions in the public policies relevant for metropolitan growth. The United States has promoted highly dispersed low-density metropolitan areas through its policies of building intra-urban highways, starving public transit, providing tax subsidies to home ownership, and allowing local governments to maintain low density by maintaining minimum residential lot sizes. Europeans have chosen different policies that encourage high-density residential living and retail precincts in the central city while inhibiting the exploitation of greenfield suburban and exurban sites suitable for modern big box retail developments. The middle part of the paper draws on recent writing by Phelps: economic dynamism is promoted by policies that promote competition and flexible equity finance and is retarded by corporatist institutions designed to protect incumbent producers and inhibit new entry. European cultural attributes inhibit the development of ambition and independence by teenagers and young adults, in contrast to the

(1) Whatever happened to the cyclical effect? Skeptics were justified on the basis of data through the end of 1999 in their claim that part of the post-1995 productivity growth revival reflected the normal cyclical correlation between productivity and output growth. In contrast data through mid-2003 reveal only a negligible cyclical effect for 1995-99 but rather a temporary bubble in 2002-03. (2) Why did productivity growth accelerate after 2000 when the ICT investment boom was collapsing? The most persuasive argument points to unusually savage corporate cost-cutting and hidden intangible investments in the late 1990s that provided productivity benefits after 2000. (3) The steady decline in the price of computer power implies steady technical progress, but then why did computers produce so little productivity growth before 1995 and so much afterwards? We draw an analogy to electricity, where miniaturization was the key step in making small electric motors practicable, and the internal combustion engine, where complementary investments, especially roads, were necessary to reap benefits. (4) What does the collapse of the investment boom imply about the future of innovation? First-rate inventions in the 1990s, notably the web and user-friendly business productivity software, are being followed by second-rate inventions in the current decade. (5) Finally, why did productivity growth slow down in Europe but accelerate in the U. S.? A consensus is emerging that U. S. institutions foster creative destruction and financial markets that welcome innovation, while Europe remains under the control of corporatist institutions that dampen competition and inhibit new entry. Further, Europe lacks a youth culture like that of the U. S. which fosters independence: U. S. teenagers work after school and college students must work to pay for much of their educational expense. There is a chasm of values across the Atlantic.

Looks at the magnitude of ICT investment''s contribution to US productivity growth.

This book details advances in the studies of chemical dynamics and photochemistry using emerging laser technologies. It examines both theoretical and experimental advances in this field and includes such topics as efficient selectivity in chemical reactions, new pulse shaping techniques, and new tool for realistic control and manipulation of molecules.

"This paper assesses the standard data on output, labor input, and capital input, which imply "one big wave" in multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth for the United States since 1870. The wave-like pattern starts with slow MFP growth in the late 19th century, then an acceleration peaking in 1928-50, and then a deceleration to a slow rate after 1972 that returns to the poor performance of 1870-1891. A counterpart of the standard data is a mysterious doubling in the ration of output to capital input when the postwar era is compared with 1870-1929 ..."--Abstract

During the four years 1995-99 U. S. productivity growth experienced a strong revival and achieved growth rates exceeding that of the golden age'' of 1913-72. Accordingly many observers have declared the New Economy'' (the Internet and the accompanying acceleration of technical change in computers and telecommunications) to be an Industrial Revolution equal in importance, or even more important, than the Second Industrial Revolution of 1860-1900 which gave us electricity, motor and air transport, motion pictures, radio, indoor plumbing, and made the golden age of productivity growth possible. This paper raises doubts about the validity of this comparison with the Great Inventions of the past. It dissects the recent productivity revival and separates the revival of 1.35 percentage points (comparing 1995-99 with 1972-95) into 0.54 of an unsustainable cyclical effect and 0.81 points of acceleration in trend growth. The entire trend acceleration is attributed to faster multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth in the durable manufacturing sector, consisting of computers, peripherals, telecommunications, and other types of durables. There is no revival of productivity growth in the 88 percent of the private economy lying outside of durables; in fact when the contribution of massive investment in computers in the nondurable economy is subtracted, MFP growth outside of durables has actually decelerated. The paper combines the Great Inventions of 1860-1900 into five clusters'' and shows how their development and diffusion in the first half of the 20th century created a fundamental transformation in the American standard of living from the bad old days of the late 19th century. In comparison, computers and the Internet fall short. The rapid decline in the cost of computer power means that the marginal utility of computer characteristics like speed and memory has fallen rapidly as well, implying that the greatest contributions of computers lie in the past, not in the future. The Internet fails the hurdle test as a Great Invention on several counts. First, the invention of the Internet has not boosted the growth in the demand for computers; all of that growth can be interpreted simply as the same unit-elastic response to the decline in computer prices as was prevalent prior to 1995. Second, the Internet provides information and entertainment more cheaply and conveniently than before, but much of its use involves substitution of existing activities from one medium to another. Third, much internet investment involves defense of market share by existing companies like Borders Books faced with the rise of Amazon; social returns are less than private returns. Fourth, much Internet activity duplicates existing activity like mail order catalogues, but the latter have not faded away; the usage of paper is rising, not falling. Finally, much Internet activity, like daytime e-trading, involves an increase in the fraction of work time involving consumption on thejob.

Angular momentum is a basic concept used in classical physics. Examples of phenomena that are related to angular momentum are: 1) Why a moving bicycle does not fall over and 2) why the currents in the ocean of the rotating earth tend to follow circular motions. Designed as a learning tool for those with limited background in quantum mechanics and to compliment Zare''s Angular Momentum, this book provides examples, problems, & solutions in angular momentum in quantum mechanics and its applications to chemistry and physics.

This paper shows how misleading is the facile contrast of Europe following a path of high productivity growth, high unemployment, and relatively greater income equality, in contrast to the opposite path being pursued by the United States. While structural shocks may initially create a positive tradeoff between productivity and unemployment, they set in motion a dynamic path of adjustment involving capital accumulation or decumulation that in principle can eliminate the tradeoff. The main theoretical contributions of this paper are to show how a productivity-unemployment tradeoff might emerge and how it might subsequently disappear as this dynamic adjustment path is set in motion. Its empirical work develops a new data base for levels and growth rates of output per hour, capital per hour, and multifactor productivity in the G-7 nations both for the aggregate economy and for nine sub-sectors. It provides regression estimates that decompose observed differences in productivity growth across sectors. It finds that much of the productivity growth advantage of the four large European countries over the United States is explained by convergence and by more rapid capital accumulation, and that the only significant effect of higher unemployment is to cause capital accumulation to decelerate, thus reducing the growth rate of output per hour relative to multi-factor productivity

Gordon (anthropology, U. of Vermont) describes the expedition 16 Denver businessmen sponsored to make their city famous by bringing back a man and women who represented the missing link between humans and the lower animals. He presents the photographs that were nearly the only result of the effort, and interprets what they were intended to portray to their creator and his audience. Paper edition (unseen), $24.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Images of the Bushman—from the innocent hero of the hit movie, The Gods Must Be Crazy, to “vermin” eradicated by the colonists, to the superhuman trackers conscripted by the South African Defense Forces, and the living embodiment of prehistory for the academic—shape our perceptions rather than the actuality. Looking at this interplay between imagery, history, and policy, Robert Gordon focuses not on the Bushman but on the colonizers'' image of them and the consequences of that image for the people assumed to be Bushmen.To understand the image of the Bushmen, we must place them into the context from which they were abstracted. The Bushman Myth, then, is a study of not only history but also of the sociology of knowledge as well as of the relationship between perceived role and economic class. Lavishly illustrated with archival and recent photographs, the book attempts to convey the extent to which we as Westerners have participated in the creation of the “Bushman” identity. This book with its poignant example of the Bushmen brings us face to face with the complexities and deceptions of our constructions of the “Other.”

This is a discussion paper on customary law. The themes include: The colonial judical structure; Manipulation of customary law; and Conclusion.

This study constructs new hedonic price indexes for electronic computers covering the period 1951-84. Regressions are estimated for four data sets, two used in previous studies by G. Chow and E. Dulberger, and two new data sets used for the first time in this study. Coverage is limited to mainframes until the late 1970s, but includes both " super-mini" computers and personal computers in the 1980s. The end result is a price index that exhibits a 1951 index number, on a base 1984 = 100, of 147,692, implying an annual rate of price change over the 33 years of -19.8 percent. Price changes for personal computer (PC) processors during the 1982-86 period appear to have been similar to those for mainframe computers during the 1977-84 period, in the range of -20 to -25 percent per year. Evidence for PC peripheral equipment is limited to 1984-86 and indicates a faster rate of price decline than for processors, particularly if the increasing availability of "clones" is taken into account. The paper places considerable emphasis on problems of weighting price indexes for computers together with price indexes for other types of "Office, Computing, and Accounting Machinery" (OCA) and other types of producers'' durable equipment (PDE). The methodology used to construct the implicit price deflators in the National Income and Product Accounts, with a fixed 1982 base year, leads to a significant downward bias in the implicit OCA and PDE deflators after 1982, and an upward bias prior to 1982. A particularly disturbing aspect of the present national accounts is a spurious rise in the implicit OCA deflator of 157 percent between 1957 and 1971, despite the fact that its computer component exhibits a price decline and its non-computer component increases by only 8 percent. The paper recommends adoption of a chain-linked Laspeyres index number for any price index aggregate that includes computers. A properly weighted PDE deflator, using our computer price index, declines relative to the official implicit PDE deflator