New Releases by Kevin H

This paper provides a summary of what is known about trends in international commodity market integration during the second half of the second millennium. The range of goods which have been traded between continents since the Voyages of Discovery has steadily increased over time, and there has been substantial commodity market integration over the period, driven by technology in the 19th century and politics in the late 20th century. However, this trend towards greater market integration was not monotonic; it was periodically interrupted by shocks such as wars and world depressions, or by endogenous political responses to the distributional effects of globalization itself. In some periods politics has reinforced the effects of technology, while in other periods it has offset them. In several cases, severe shocks have had long-run effects on the international integration of commodity markets, as a result of politically induced hysteresis. Finally, we know remarkably little about international commodity market integration during the 20th century.

There are two contrasting views of pre-19th century trade and globalization. First, there are the world history scholars like Andre Gunder Frank who attach globalization ''big bang'' significance to the dates 1492 (Christopher Colombus stumbles on the Americas in search of spices) and 1498 (Vasco da Gama makes an end run around Africa and snatches monopoly rents away from the Arab and Venetian spice traders). Such scholars are on the side of Adam Smith who believed that these were the two most important events in recorded history. Second, there is the view that the world economy was fragmented and completely de- globalized before the 19th century. This paper offers a novel way to discriminate between these two competing views and we use it to show that there is no evidence that the Ages of Discovery and Commerce had the economic impact on the global economy that world historians assign to them, while there is plenty of evidence of a very big bang in the 19th century. The test involves a close look at the connections between factor prices, commodity prices and endowments world wide.

Full Circle is a how-to book that will prove you can trigger emotional responses in an individual or group therapy session using the right spiritual cues. You''ll learn about the Spiritual Therapy Program and find the answers to general questions about how and where to establish the program. Full Circle also contains 80 thematic lesson plans for use in both group and individual sessions. The lessons are flexible and organized into lists to help you formulate the right agenda for individual dementia patients. In addition, Full Circle has expanded units for higher achieving seniors. You may also want to use the special notes, poetry, and quotations that are pinpointed within the appropriate specific theme for even more startling results. Full Circle''s sophisticated approach to therapy will help you cater to the needs of the cognitively impaired elderly to trigger emotional responses and enhance overall quality of life.

Trade theorists have come to understand that their theory is ambiguous on the question: Are trade and factor flows substitutes? While this sounds like an open invitation for empirical research, hardly any serious econometric work has appeared in the literature. This paper uses history to fill the gap. It treats the experience of the Atlantic economy between 1870 and 1940 as panel data with almost seven hundred observations. When shorter run business cycles and long swings'' are extracted from the panel data, substitutability is soundly rejected. When secular relationships are extracted over longer time periods and across trading partners, once again substitutability is soundly rejected. Finally, the paper explores immigration policy and finds that policy makers never behaved as if they viewed trade and immigration as substitutes.

The literature on multinationals and developing countries has examined the causality" running from direct investment to changes in country characteristics (wages skills, etc.) and also the opposite direction of causality, from existing country characteristics to" inward direct investment. This paper contributes to the second line of research the question of what country characteristics, particularly market size and labor-force" composition, attract inward investment. This approach is motivated by the empirical" observation that the poorest countries attract a far smaller share of world direct investment than" their share of income. Small markets receive less investment per capita than larger ones. We" develop a model that generates both stylized facts in equilibrium, suggesting the existence of a" development trap for small, skilled-labor-scarce countries.

On average, the poor European periphery converged on the rich industrial core in the four or five decades prior to World War I. Some, like the three Scandinavian economies, used industrialization to achieve a spectacular convergence on the leaders, especially in real wages and living standards. Some, like Ireland, seemed to do it without industrialization. Some, like Italy, underwent less spectacular catch-up, and it was limited to the industrializing North. Some, like Iberia, actually fell back. What accounts for this variety? What role did trade and tariff policy play? What about emigration and capital flows? What about schooling? We offer a tentative assessment of these contending explanations and conclude that globalization was by far the dominant force accounting for convergence (and divergence) around the periphery. Some exploited it well, and some badly.

As part of a process that has been at work since 1850, real wages among the current OECD countries converged during the late 19th century. The convergence was pronounced as that which we have seen in the post World War Il period. This paper uses computable general equilibrium models to isolate the sources of that economic convergence by assessing the relative performance of the two most important economies in the Old World and the New -- Britain and the USA. It turns out that between 1870 and 1910, the convergence forces that mattered were those that generated by commodity price convergence, stresses by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, and mass migration, stressed by Knut Wicksell. It turns out that offsetting forces were contributing to late 19th century divergence, a finding consistent with economic historians'' traditional attention to Britain''s alleged failure and America''s spectacular rise to industrial supremacy. The convergence forces, however, dominated for most of the period.