Most Popular Books by E. Morris

Richard E. Morris was an American GI in Patton''s Third Army, fighting in Europe during the final months of WWII. His wife, Lavila, like so many soldiers'' wives, kept the home fires burning, caring for their only child, waiting for news about her husband. Where was he? Was he safe? Did he know how much she missed him? His letters home not only explained the challenges of war but also provided a lifeline that eased the loneliness and kept alive their hopes for a swift and happy reunion. But more than just a collection of letters from the front lines, "Hello Darling" is a carefully researched portrait of a fascinating moment in history and a woman''s love that withstood one of the greatest challenges a family can face.

Callee is a young teenage girl who is finally just starting to fit in after moving to a new town over a year ago. When out of nowhere a gray eyed stunning young man named Ian flies in and sweeps her off her feet. Calee can see there is something specail about this heavenly creature. Can Calee figure out Ian''s deepest darkest secrects before it''s to late? A forbidden love that streches across the heavens, read and enjoy "Once We Have Fallen."

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The author reminisces about her personal and family life while growing up in Wetumpka, Alabama during the Civil Rights Movement, including being among the group of African-American students to pioneer integration in the Wetumpka public schools during the 1960s.

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Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes.